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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade after the Arab oil embargo,1 the industrialized
West still relies on an endless string of ocean tankers to satisfy its proffi-
gate need for energy. Every day, more than 100,000,000 tons of oil are
transported by ocean vessels.2 In shipping lanes that each day become
more congested and dangerous, the world tanker fleet sails through the
Strait of Hormuz, around the Cape of Good Hope, and on to the ports of
the North Atlantic and Europe. With each year that the ocean vessels
operate, they grow more obsolete and unreliable and pose a greater haz-
ard to the high seas.
In the last decade, marine pollution from tankers has made the
oceans noticeably more foul. While catastrophic tanker accidents, like
the wreck of the AMOCO CADIZ in the English Channel, have domi-
nated the headlines, the routine deballasting operations of oil tankers
have quietly spewed millions of tons of oil into the world's waters. The
effects of this pollution do not confine themselves to aesthetic repug-
nance. They threaten to destroy commercial fishing, on which man in-
creasingly depends for protein, and pose an additional threat of directly
endangering his health.
1 For a discussion of the legal, economic, and political consequences of the Arab oil embargo of
1973 and the growth of OPEC, see Dempsey, Economic Aggression and Self-Defense in International
Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 253 (1977).
2 INTERNATIONAL TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FEDERATION LIMITED, OIL COMPANIES
INSTITUTE FOR MARINE POLLUTION COMPENSATION LIMITED, OIL COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL
MARINE FORUM, OIL INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION FORUM, Ac-




The United Nations has responded to marine pollution by charging
its specialized agency, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization ("IMCO"), with the dual obligations of improving mari-
time safety and preventing marine pollution. Yet, despite several major
conventions intended to eliminate outmoded tanker designs and pollut-
ing practices, oil spills and discharges continue.
This article will address the question of compliance with and en-
forcement of international agreements concerning oil pollution by tank-
ers. In particular, it will analyze the enforcement and compliance
records of maritime nations under the existing international legal re-
gime-OILPOL 54. It will be demonstrated that the effectiveness of
such conventions is significantly undermined by the concept that the
high seas are a "commons," for the common enjoyment (and abuse) of
all mankind, and by the legal fiction of "flags of convenience."
The significance of this analysis is accentuated by the fact that we
now stand on the threshold of a new international legal order for the high
seas, one which may have profound implications for the question of mari-
time pollution. This new order is characterized by two recent develop-
ments in the law: the promulgation of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention3
and Law of the Sea Convention.4 During this same period, the name of
IMCO was changed to the International Maritime Commission
("IMO"), reflecting in part the new powers it has recently been granted
to promulgate binding regulations upon member states.5 This article will
endeavor to explore each of these revolutionary developments in the law
3 Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
From Ships, 1973 opened for signature Jan. 1, 1978, reprinted in 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2381
(Nov. 10, 1978) (entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 2, 1983). See infra text accompanying notes
190-201.
4 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982), reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1261 (1982). See infra text accom-
panying notes 202-298.
5 As a result of amendments to the agency's Convention, the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization's "IMCO" name was changed to the International Maritime Organiza-
tion "IMO" effective May 22, 1982. In part, this change of nomenclature reflects an expansion of
the powers of the agency. For example, under the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS") Conven-
tion, amendments could enter into force only if 2/3 of the member states agreed with the IMCO
recommendation. Recently, IMO has been given authority to impose binding regulations pursuant
to SOLAS under "tacit acceptance" procedures. Such amendments now automatically enter into
force unless i/3 of the members whose combined fleets total at least 50% of the world's merchant
fleet reject them. See Broad Agreement Reached on Next SOLAS Amendments, 4 IMO NEWS 8
(1982). This represents a departure from the traditional limitations which deprived the agency of
rulemaking authority. These limitations on IMO have contrasted sharply with other U.N. organiza-
tions (eg., the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Meterological Organization, the
International Telecommunications Union, and the World Health Organization), which have long
held authority to adopt, revise or repeal binding technical regulations without the need for member
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governing environmental protection of the seas, and in particular, pollu-
tive discharges by international transportation vessels. But first, let us
explore the urgency which compels the planet's living inhabitants to es-
tablish an effective legal regime to regulate such activities.
II. THE THREAT, REALITY, AND TRAGEDY OF OCEAN POLLUTION
Thor Heyerdahl has speculated that the ancient Egyptian and Cen-
tral American civilizations may have cross fertilized. If nothing else, a
detached observation of the independent construction of massive pyra-
mids on the American and African continents leads one to ponder why
these ancient civilizations were so similar. To test his theory, Heyerdahl
built a small papyrus reed raft of Egyptian design which he christened
"Ra," and set sail from the coast of Africa, heading westward. Ulti-
mately, he succeeded in reaching the islands of the Carribean, proving
that there may indeed have been ancient mariners who shared the accom-
plishments of the ancient Mediterranean civilizations with those of the
Aztec and Mayan cultures.6
But Heyerdahl traveled in the twentieth century; he experienced a
phenomenon his Egyptian predecessors would have been spared. No
matter where he sailed in the North Atlantic, the Norwegian explorer
was distressed to find clumps of oil in various sizes floating in the wa-
ters-some so large that they supported whole colonies of barnacles.
This material, the feces of the industrial revolution and the population
explosion, had come to spoil even the pure waters of the oceans, to which
life on this planet owes its genesis. What were the causes of this pollu-
tion, and what would be its consequences? If indeed, the effects are sig-
nificantly deleterious, how might such injury be prevented?
In the short term, oil pollution on the high seas will have both aes-
thetic and economic consequences-tourist and fishing industries will
surely suffer.7 The long term effects may be far more profound. First,
state approval. See Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships, 26 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 558, 574 (1978).
Also, the recent amendments enable IMO to continue to lawfully perform its defacto assump-
tion of jurisdiction over marine pollution beyond its traditional dejure functions of maritime safety
and technical promotion. See generally Address by Mario Valenzuela, 16th Annual Conference on
the Law of the Sea Institute, Halifax, Canada, (June 20-24, 1982) (discussing IMO: Public Interna-
tional Law and Regulation) (manuscript available at Northwestern University Journal of Interna-
tional Law & Business) [hereinafter cited as Valenzuela].
6 T. HEYERDAHL, THE RA EXPEDITIONS (1972).
7 Although the public may have grown numb to the sight of thick brown sludge floating on the
waves and thousands of oil-smeared birds dragging themselves ashore to die, the hazards of oil
pollution to human life should dispel any apathy. Moreover, the economic loss of a major oil spill
can be staggering. For example, the AMOCO CADIZ break-up inflicted $300 million in damages to
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hydrocarbons may build up on the food chain, creating possibilities of
increased carcinogenic exposure. Second, diminished fishing harvests
may impair the ability of man to feed himself. Third, the ultimate sterili-
zation of the oceans may result in the loss of much of the world's oxygen,
for the oceans are our major producers of that essential prerequisite to
life on earth.
Standing on a sandy beach looking into the vastness of our oceans, it
is difficult to comprehend how man, relatively insignificant in compari-
son to the grandeur of the seas, could make an impact of any conse-
quence on their waters. Breakers crash against the coast in a natural and
innocent display of power that demands nothing from its living observ-
ers, yet commands their respect, as would a benevolent giant. The
oceans' waves, currents, eddies, and swells give them life not in the bio-
logical sense, but in a physical sense. If poisoned, their currents will not
cease to flow nor will its waves cease to curl. The oceans will quietly
accept any abuse delivered, even if they ultimately become the cesspools
of civilization. Birds may no longer dot the coastline in search of food,
but the waters will still rise and fall as they always have. Fish may no
longer be able to tolerate the polluted waters, but the tide will sweep
softly inward and outward. Man may make his environment so adverse
to life that he himself is destroyed, but the ocean, devoid of its biological
brethren, will continue to exist, albeit alone.
In contrast to the physical vitality of the oceans, biological existence
is not immune to the effects of pollution. Certain environmental condi-
tions must remain within reasonable boundaries in order to support
life-conditions that are altered when humans introduce oil into the
marine environment. Millions of organisms, this and every year, will suf-
fer and die an agonizing death as a result of the lethal and sublethal
effects of oil pollution. And man himself may ultimately suffer the conse-
quences of his indifference to the destruction of the environment.
Oil finds its way into the oceans of the world in a variety of ways.
The sources of pollution can be broadly classified into two basic catego-
ries: land based and marine based polluters. Land based pollution in-
cludes such unlikely sources as the small oil and gas slicks one sees in
parking lots and on streets washed by rain into storm sewers, automobile
emissions that return to earth in droplets of acid rain, and an estimated
3.5 million gallons per year of waste automobile crankcase oil.' Land
the French fishing and tourism industries, a loss that was born over a number of years by individuals
and small businessmen. Koenig, Remember the Amoco Cadiz, AUDUBON, Mar. 1981, at 103.
8 Anderson, National and International Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil Pollu-
tion, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 985, 996 n.40 (1976).
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sources are responsible for a significant percentage of ocean hydrocarbon
pollution. Oil spills and wastes that occur on land eventually find their
way into the rivers, which then carry the pollution into the sea.
Table I sets forth the National Academy of Sciences estimates for
1973 of all sources of petroleum hydrocarbons entering the oceans.9
TABLE I
SOURCE MILLIONS OF TONS
PER YEAR
Marine transportation 2.133
Offshore oil production .08










The above figures reveal that oil spills from tanker vessels are far from
the only source of petroleum pollution of the oceans. Nevertheless, ships
are responsible for a significant amount of pollution, the impact of which
is felt throughout the marine environment. Two tanker disasters in the
English Channel, the TORRY CANYON and the AMOCO CADIZ,
mark an eleven year period during which sixty major tanker accidents
spilled 1.6 million tons of oil into the sea.'0 In 1979 alone, over 750,000
tons of oil were lost in accidents, an increase of half a million tons over
1975. "
Regrettably, tanker accidents frequently do not occur in the mari-
time deserts of the open sea, where harmful effects might be dissipated,
but instead occur in valuable coastal areas. Between 1967 and 1978,
eighty percent of all oil spilled by tankers was spilled within ten miles of
shore.12 Treacherous and heavily travelled sea lanes, such as the English
9 Id. For a review of IMO's estimates, which are somewhat more conservative than these see
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION, PETROLEUM IN THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT (1981).
10 Koenig, supra note 7, at 106.
11 See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & DEP'T OF STATE, GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO




Channel and the Cape of Good Hope, are particularly susceptible to oil
spills. Despite the hazards, nearly 2500 tankers, laden with some 600
million tons of Middle East crude, round the Cape annually.' 3
Of the estimated 200 million tons of oil pollution attributable to ves-
sel sources each year, less than forty percent arises from the highly publi-
cized oil spills.'4 Rather, the majority of ship source pollution is from
"operational" activities, whereby petroleum is intentionally dumped into
the oceans. Operational vessel source pollution includes two processes:
de-ballasting and tank washing. De-ballasting involves the discharge of
water placed into empty oil storage tanks to help maintain vessel stabil-
ity. Oil residue inside the tanks (L e., elingage) mixes with the water and
is pumped out into the sea when the water is drained. The second opera-
tional source of pollution is tank washing, in which clingage is flushed
out to sea as storage tanks are cleaned. Operational vessel source pollu-
tion is responsible for dumping between 1.5 to 2.5 million metric tons per
year of oil into the oceans.' 5
Accidents by tankers accounted for ten to fifteen percent of the two
million tons of oil spilled into the oceans yearly between 1976 and 1979.
As has been indicated, the major source of pollution is the deliberate
pumping of oil into the sea by tankers;' 6 sea water is used as ballast after
delivery of oil and pumped back into the ocean. 17 While deliberate oper-
ational discharges of dirty ballast and fuel purification sludges are made
by only a minority of oil tankers and other ships, they nevertheless ac-
13 Watling, Don't Touch (Tanker Traffic Around Cape of Good Hope), OCEANS, July/Aug. 1980,
at 62.
It is estimated that 90% of western Europe's oil rounds the Cape of Good Hope. Approxi-
mately 586 million tons of oil is moved around the Cape annually, approximately half of which is
transported on tankers with a capacity of 200,000 tons each. "The pollution of [the African] beaches
and coastal ecosystems with oil from production, refining and shipping has already been observed."
Tangi, Discovering Oil in West and Central Africa, THE SIREN, July 1982, at 9, 11. A survey of 14
African nations revealed that nearly 3/4 experience "common" to "serious" levels of oil pollution on
their beaches. Id. at 12. It is estimated that the region annually averages oil spillage of 1,000 metric
tons within 50 miles of land, and 3,338 metric tons beyond the 50 mile zone. Id. at 13.
14 Dramatic catastrophes, such as the AMOCO CADIZ, contribute only between two to four
percent of the oil spilled into the ocean. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that nearly all the six
million metric tons spewed into the waters each year is the result of routine discharges, such as
ballast clearing the tank cleaning. Empty tankers ride too high in the water to maintain stability in
rough ocean waters, so empty oil tanks are filled with seawater to keep an even keel. This dirty
ballast is often discharged into the sea several miles beyond the port's territorial limit. Although
segregated ballast tanks would eliminate the problem of dirty ballast, many owners have eschewed
the cost of retrofitting existing tankers. Howarth, Fish Versus Fuel: A Shipping Quandry, TECHNOL-
OGY REv., Jan. 1981, at 74.
15 Anderson, supra note 8, at 996 n.40.
16 Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 HOUSTON J.
INT'L L. 67, 88 (1980).
17 Id.
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count for ninety percent of all vessel-source pollution."8 Since most flags
of convenience ships are primarily responsible for transporting the
world's oil, most pollution from both tanker accidents and intentional
dumping can be attributed to these vessels. 9 Panama and Liberia are the
most notorious for granting registration to foreign-owned vessels.2"
Once oil enters the ocean, it begins to mix with the sea water. The
lighter components evaporate when exposed to the atmosphere. Oil that
remains on the surface will be oxidized by sunlight and bacterial action.
Oxidation is the natural process that breaks down the petroleum. Since
this natural safeguard is aided by warm temperatures, oil spills in cold
arctic climates may last as long as fifty years.21
If the oil does not sink (by attaching itself to small particles in the
water) or wash ashore, it will form tarry lumps. It is estimated that
87,000 tons of these tar balls are added to the oceans each year. 2 Eighty
percent of the Caribbean Sea, ninety percent of the Antilles, and vast
areas of the Atlantic have been polluted in this manner.23 A research
vessel between Rhodes and the Azores found tar balls in seventy-five per-
cent of the surface tows it made.24 Scientists who were conducting a
study in the Sargasso Sea, southwest of the United States, were forced to
abandon their work because their nets became fowled with thick globs of
tar. The African coast is heavily polluted by oil and tar, making it no
exception to the rule that tarry lumps can be found on most beaches of
the world.25
Although large amounts of oil remain on the surface, much of it is
mixed into the water column, either through wave action or the use of
dispersants applied to oil slicks. Unfortunately, as the spill breaks up,
the environmental hazard does not disappear; it increases. Dissolved oil
and oil globules fall through the water column, growing more toxic as
they approach bottom. Concentrations of dissolved oil from 0.2 to 1 part
per billion, a harmful level already found in coastal waters near many
cities, can skyrocket to as high as 250 parts per billion.26




21 Schacter & Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 89
(1971).
22 Anderson, supra note 8, at 994 n.35.
23 Id.
24 Schacter & Serwer, supra note 21, at 89.
25 R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 23
(1979).




High levels of dissolved oil increase the concentration of toxic chem-
icals in commercial fish and severely disrupt the marine food chain. Oil
pollution reduces the ocean's phytoplankton in coastal areas, where most
of the world's commercial fish and oxygen are produced. Sea beds, an
essential source of food for bottom dwelling commercial fish, become
contaminated and sterile.
The ramifications of introducing such high concentrations of petro-
leum pollution into the oceans are severe. Oil pollution disrupts phyto-
plankton, the microscopic plant life in the ocean that forms algae and
serves an important function in the ecosystem. First, oil interferes with
phytoplankton photosynthesis. Such interference may eventually reduce
the oxygen output and the carbon dioxide uptake of the ocean. More-
over, increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere may cause a "green-
house effect," such that heat will not be allowed to radiate into space,
causing an increase in global temperatures. As a long term effect, the ice
caps could eventually melt, causing the sea level to increase up to 200
feet, submerging most coastal cities.' 7
The second function of phytoplankton that is disrupted by oil polu-"
tion involves its contribution to the food chain. Oil slicks poison and
smother the smaller organisms at the base of the food chain, such as
phytoplankton and zooplankton. Those organisms that survive absorb
oil components that mix with sea water. In this way, oil components are
introduced into the food chain. These components can cause cancer and
mutations in living organisms. A study by Massachusetts Institute of
Technology found 100-200 pounds of known carcinogens in every 10,000
tons of oil spilled.2" Through the process of bio-accumulation, the situa-
tion becomes more dangerous to life forms higher on the food chain,
including homo sapiens.
1000 lbs. of phytoplankton are consumed by 100 lbs. of zooplankton or
shellfish, which in turn feed 50 lbs. of anchovies or other small fish. These
are consumed by 10 lbs. of small carnivores, which is eaten by one lb. of
large carnivore which is caught and eaten by man. The one pound of carni-
vore eaten by man contains essentially the same accumulated pollutants as
the 1,000 lbs. of phytoplankton.29
Evidence of oil components actually entering and adversely affecting the
food chain exists through the many reports of tainting. Some fish and
shellfish caught in areas of chronic oil discharge take on an oily taste,
making them difficult to market.30 In addition to the deleterious eco-
27 Anderson, supra note 8, at 992 n.26.
28 Id. at 993 n.29.
29 IdL at 992 n.22.
30 See R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 35.
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nomic impact of such taste spoilage, the oil also contaminates the food
web.31 Of course, this presumes that members of the food chain can sur-
vive the toxic effects of petroleum long enough to pass the accumulated
contamination to man.
The tragic impact of oil pollution on living organisms is aptly
demonstrated by observing different species, and understanding the ex-
tent of their suffering. For example, it has been noted that coral reefs in
the Red Sea suffer from a nearly "complete lack of recolonization." 32 Oil
pollution has caused the coral to produce fewer and smaller gonads, as
well as creating abnormal behavior in offspring. Additional conse-
quences are reduced rates of growth, tissue damage, and interference
with feeding of coral. Similar effects have been noted in sea anemones
where one study concluded that "... numbers of surviving young fell to
zero, and ovaries were found to be regressed and lacking ova. . . . The
response to food offered to the tentacles was slow or absent."33
Fish of all types must deal with the lethal and sublethal effects of oil
in their environment. While oil itself does not readily stick to the mu-
cous coating that covers the external surface of most fish, dispersants
used to break up oil slicks destroy this protection, leaving fish more sus-
ceptible to the pollution.34 The fate awaiting fish populations includes
disruption of the proper functioning of gills, ingestion of toxic concentra-
tions of pollution, fin erosion, diseased cardiac valves in heart muscles,
olfactory lesions, and lesions to the intestine, eye, central nervous system,
gill, liver, and pancreas.35 Spills can be devastating to fish populations.
When the R.C. STONER spilled aviation and diesel fuels off of Wake Is-
land, an estimated 2,500 kilograms of reef fishes were killed.3 6 A survey
31 Oil pollution has devastating effects on life in the marine ecosystem, that can be summarized
as follows: (1) lethal toxic effects such as poisoning where cellular and subcellular processes are
interfered with to the extent that death follows directly; (2) sublethal effects where physiological or
behavioral activities are disrupted but death is not immediate; mortality can result from interference
with feeding and reproductive activities, or from inducement of abnormal behavior, or other indirect
causes; (3) the uptake of oil or certain components of oil causing tainting, cancer, and mutations;
(4) the introduction and transfer of pollutants into members of the food web rendering them unfit for
consumption by other animals including man; (5) direct smothering and suffocation as a result of
being covered with oil; (6) chemical and physical habitate alterations resulting in composition and
diversity shifts between and within different species. IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO/WHO/
IAEAIUN Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, Impact of Oil on
the Marine Environment Reports & Studies #6, at 54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gesamp Report].
32 Ormond & Caldwell, The Effect of Oil Pollution on the Reproduction and Feeding Behavior of
the Sea Anemone Actinia Equina, 13 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 118 (No. 4, 1982).
33 Id.
34 Gesamp Report, supra note 31, at 54.
35 Hodgins, Petroleum and Marine Fishes: A Review of Uptake, Disposition, and Effects, 15
ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 1272, 1278 (1981).
36 Gesamp Report, supra note 31, at 59.
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within three days of the West Ialmouth spill found ninety-five percent of
the catch dead.37
Despite the lethal effects on fish, the most significant biological ef-
fects of oil pollution are the sublethal effects that can cause genetic
changes and deformities, and disrupt migration, feeding, and reproduc-
tion." Particularly hard hit are the developing embryos and larvae of
certain species, which can be severely affected by even low concentrations
of pollution in the water.39 In 1971, Jacques Cousteau estimated that a
thirty to fifty percent decrease in the vitality of the ocean had occurred
during the previous twenty years." If oil pollution from tankers contin-
ues at its present levels, between sixty and eighty percent of commercially
valuable marine species will be affected by the year 2000.4'
Mankind will suffer as the ocean harvests decline; and the world
food requirements will soar as the world's population explodes. Shrimp
harvests in the Gulf of Mexico have plummeted from fourteen tons per
day to a mere two tons per day in the thirty years since offshore drilling
operations began. Shellfish beds off Brittany were despoiled by the TOR-
REY CANYON and AMoco CADIz disasters. If the world is to feed itself
at the end of the century, it cannot afford this injury to commercial fish.
Although annual fish harvests will have to increase their protein yield by
over 100 million metric tons from current levels to satisfy nutritional
requirements by the year 2000, the dismal news is that the global harvest
has peaked and will decline. If oil pollution from tankers is not con-
trolled, the most immediate effect will be on ocean fisheries, where an-
chovy and cod will be supplanted by bloodworms and jellyfish, species
better adapted for oil-thick waters.
Furthermore, the tragic effects of petroleum in the environment are
not limited to creatures in the water. In fact, of all the different classes of
wildlife suffering from marine pollution, the most adversely affected
group is probably the birds. Curiously, seabirds seem to be drawn to oil
slicks, perhaps because they mistake the smooth appearance of the slick
for calm waters.42 The calm appearance, however, masks a hazard that is
anything but hospitable. A bird coming into contact with oil can suffer
an agonizing death in any one of several ways. A bird's feathers may lose
their waterproofing characteristics, which then allows cold sea water to
chill the body. Waterlogged and laden with oil, birds suffer a loss of
37 R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 35 n.55.
38 Anderson, supra note 8, at 993.
39 Hodgins, supra note 35, at 1278.
40 Anderson, supra note 8, at 994 n.35.
41 GLOBAL 2000, supra note 11, at 35.
42 Anderson, supra note 8, at 993.
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buoyancy. Flying or swimming abilities are also affected, often resulting
in simple starvation or drowning.43 Ingestion of the oil (usually through
feeding or attempts by the bird to clean itself) also may result in death.
Internal disruptions that are caused by the intake of oil include fatty
degradation of the liver, toxic nephrosis, enlargement of the spleen, adre-
nocortical hyperplasia, acinar atrophy of the pancreas, and lipid pneu-
monia. Further, oil interferes with internal mechanisms that maintain
proper water balance. The result is death by dehydration.' Examina-
tions of sea birds killed by the ARGO MERCHANT oil spill attributed the
cause of death to hemorrhagic lungs, pneumonia, kidney blockage, kid-
ney and lung congestion, and chronic exposure to parasites.45
The tremendous detrimental impact of oil on individual birds even-
tually takes its toll on entire populations to the extent that certain species
and subspecies are threatened with extinction. For example, pollution
from tanker traffic along the southern tip of Africa presently threatens
the Jackass Penguin with total eradication. 4 A small oil slick in 1971
near the Shetland Islands resulted in the death of an estimated 10,000
birds, including ten percent of the Guillemont population. Again, in
1971, a separate incident in the Netherlands caused the death of all of the
wintering coot and mallard populations, as well as seventy-five percent of
the Greyleg geese, and eighty percent of the Bewick populations.47 The
number of sea birds killed in the North Sea and the North Atlantic from
chronic oil pollution each year is estimated to be between 150,000 and
450,000. 4' De-ballasting off the coast of Alaska causes upwards of
10,000 waterfowl deaths per year. It was reported in 1971 that tank
washing off southeast Newfoundland killed hundreds of penguin-like
Murre every day.4 9
Within the animal kingdom, the killing effects of oil pollution play
no favorites. Any organism coming into contact with a slick may fall
prey to its black death. Mammals are no exception. Their fur is affected
when fouled with oil in the same way feathers of birds are affected. Fur
may lose its waterproofing properties and its ability to insulate the animal
from the cold. Mobility may be restricted to the extent that the animal
43 Id
44 Gesamp Report, supra note 31, at 57.
45 Morson, The Argo Merchant Oil Spill: Impacts on Birds and Mammals, in THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONFERENCE ON ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF OIL SPILLS, at 191 (American
Institute of Biological Sciences 1978).
46 R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 35 n.53.
47 Gesamp Report, supra note 31, at 55.
48 R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 34.
49 Anderson, supra note 8, at 993 n.32.
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becomes unable to hunt and more prone to predation."0
In 1977, the California sea otter was placed on the endangered spe-
cies list. According to Glenn Van Blaricon and Ronald Jameson of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, "[t]he listing was based on the
possibility that a major oil spill could occur within the sea otter range
and could kill a significant portion of the population, placing it in danger
of extinction."'" This regrettable speculation was based on observations
of actual incidents such as the ARROW spill. In Chedubucto Bay where
several thousand Grey Harbor seals normally were found, only 500 were
sighted after the spill, and thirteen of those were dead. 2 On Sable Island
only fifty to sixty harbor seals were observed, along with 100 grey seals,
eleven of which were dead. The seals died of suffocation as the oil
plugged their mouths, noses, and throats. Those that survived suffered
great pain from the oil's effect on their eyes and ears. 3
Large numbers of sea-lion pups were found dead when oil sur-
rounded their breeding colony on San Miguel Island during the Santa
Barbara spill. The incident occurred while the grey whales were in their
seasonal migration. Although some scholars do not consider the evi-
dence sufficient to blame oil as the cause of death, others point to the five
whales and several porpoises found dead as evidencing a "rather high[er]
mortality" than what normally could be expected. 4 A study of petro-
leum on ringed seals revealed that the animal suffers from exposure to
the pollutant. Inhalation of toxic fumes and accumulation of hydrocar-
bons in tissues and body fluids were two relatively mild reactions ob-
served by the study. The most sobering result was the rapid death of all
animals after oil immersion. 5
Unfortunately, it is economically rational for vessel owners and op-
erators to dump contaminated sludge into the "commons" of the high
seas rather than absorb the costs of arranging for appropriate waste dis-
posal on land, retrofitting existing vessels, or purchasing more expensive
vessels with segregated ballasts. 6 The high seas are subject to what Gar-
ret Hardin has described as the "Tragedy of the Commons:"
50 Gesamp Report, supra note 31, at 58.
51 Van Blaricom & Jameson, Lumber Spill in Central California Water Implications for Oil
Spills and Sea Otters, 215 SCIENCE 1503 (March 19, 1982).
52 Gesamp Report, supra note 31, at 58.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Englehardt, Petroleum Hydrocarbons in the Arctic Ringed Seal Phoca Hispida, Following Ex-
perimental Oil Exposure, 1978 CONF. ON ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL IMPACrS OF OIL SPILLS 614
(1978).
56 It is also economically rational for vessel owners to register their ships in nations which may
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Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all men.
Likewise, the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the
philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically
have lower standards regarding enforcement and compliance with international environmental con-
ventions. Many "flag of convenience" nations may fall into this category.
The transportation of oil on the world market is intensely competitive, and operating costs for
U.S. registered vessels are as much as 70% higher than those of foreign vessels. In the absence of
government subsidization, U.S. owned oil tankers can remain competitive only by operating under
flags of convenience. B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 27-32 (1962).
The higher operating costs of U.S. registered vessels are the result of U.S. labor, safety, and
construction regulatory laws and higher U.S. taxes. For example, all officers and at least 75% of the
crew must be U.S. citizens. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) provides:
Nationality of crews-
(a) [A]ll licensed officers and pilots of vessels of the United States shall be citizens of the
United States, native born, or completely naturalized.
(b) [U]pon each departure of any such vessel from a port of the United States, 75 per centum
of the crew, excluding licensed officers, shall be citizens of the United States, native-born or
completely naturalized ...
(d) The owner, agent, or officer of any such vessel, who shall employ any person in violation of
the provisions of this section, shall be subject to a penalty of $500 for each offense.
While these crews are subject to U.S. and union minimum wage requirements, overtime limits
and fringe benefits, a flag of convenience vessel can employ non-American crews at substantially
lower costs. B. BOCZEK, supra at 27-32. A semi-skilled worker on a United States flag ship earns
roughly $18,000 a year including four months of paid vacation, while a foreign national on a flag of
convenience ship earns approximately $5,000 a year. Payne, supra note 16, at 71.
Because of the disproportionate costs and the desirability of having U.S. registered ships, Con-
gress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to provide subsidies for the United States flag fleet.
Wittig, Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages, Problems, and Dangers, 14 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 115, 120 (1979).
To qualify for the subsidy, however, the vessel must be built in the United States, which in-
creases the construction cost of the vessel and causes a corresponding net reduction in the amount of
the subsidy. Id. In addition, since a number of foreign shipowners also receive subsidies and their
labor costs are relatively lower, U.S. flag shipowners may not be competitive even with subsidization.
Id.
In addition to avoiding wage and construction regulations, shipowners can also avoid meeting
expensive safety standards by registering in a flag of convenience state. Many vessels which are too
old to be registered in the United States are registered in flag of convenience states. Juda, IMCO and
the Regulation of Ocean Pollution Under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, 10 J. MAR.
L. & CoM. 577 (1977). Flag of convenience operators can man ships with fewer men and with fewer
qualifications than required by other countries. Id. It has been found that these practices have
threatened the safety of the crew and ship. Id. In addition, flag of convenience ships frequently have
lower standards involving working conditions that affect the safety and health of the seamen.
Another economic advantage to registering ships in flag of convenience states is the absence of
income or corporate tax on maritime operations. Wittig, supra, at 121. A United States shipowner
can couple this advantage with favorable U.S. tax laws by creating a foreign corporation in the flag
state. "Generally the United States imposes taxes on a wholly owned foreign subsidiary only for
income derived from United States sources or for profits that are distributed to United States share-
holders as dividends." Id. Thus, taxes cannot be avoided altogether but the shipowner can use the




to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas." Professing to believe in the
"inexhaustible resources of the oceans," they bring species after species of
fish and whales closer to extinction.
57
The legal regime of the high seas is dominated by principles estab-
lished during the Seventeenth Century, long before there were any envi-
ronmental hazards associated with its use.5" Hence, principles such as
57 G. HARDIN, EXPLORING NEW ETHIcs FOR SURvIVAL 254 (1978):
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such
an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching,
and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, this is, the day when the long-desired goal
of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorse-
lessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly,
more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my
herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
(1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herds-
man receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly
+1.
(2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one
more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular decisionmaking herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another....
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit-in a world that is limited.
58 The recorded law of the sea surfaced in 1608, manifested in the debate between Grotious (of
the Netherlands) and Selden (of Great Britain). In the three ensuing centuries, the identical debate
has ebbed and flowed around the same points of controversy, i.e. freedom of the seas vs. national
territoriality. Initially, the majority of the ocean-using nations adopted Grotious' concept of total
freedom. That trend, however, is being pushed into the background as a result of the technological
revolution. A brief review of this development will help the reader to visualize the ongoing tensions
which shape the law of the sea and keep it in a state of constant turmoil.
In the Seventeenth Century the major ocean-going nations were the Netherlands and Great
Britain. It is only natural, then, that conflicts would arise between the two with respect to the use of
the oceans. It was Grotious' position that the seas were infinite and therefore should be subject to
unlimited common use by the world's inhabitants. Selden, on the other hand, propounded the no-
tion that the waters of the world could be platted and owned, just as the land. Therefore, Selden felt
that the seas should be divided and owned and regulated by independent nations.
In actuality, this debate stemmed from the real issue of tariff setting. Tariffs, under Selden's
theory, could be freely imposed upon ships traversing the territorial waters of the independent na-
tions. England, being in a position of prominence in the ocean world at the time, would be able to
profit thereby. Grotious contended, however, that such multiplicity of regulation would result in
unreasonable constraints upon international trade.
The Grotious' concept of total freedom prevailed over Selden's closed sea, and it became the
central concept for the 300 years following the storm of the debate. The practice which ensued was
the free use of the seas by both riparian and non-riparian nations, limited only to the extent that no
one nation could unreasonably diminish another's freedom or inflict injury upon another. (From the
vantage point of the Twentieth century, it is plain to see that the freedom of the sea extended to the
freedom to pollute and exploit.)
During this period of extensive freedom, however, there continued to be rumblings concerning
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freedom of navigation, unobstructed use of the high seas,59 and flags of
convenience' continue in force, even though developed in a period
the freedom of the riparians to interfere with the freedom of those using the waters. Coastal waters,
bays and inlets appeared to naturally fall within the realm of the coastal nations which insisted upon
maintaining some sort of control over these areas, which going totally uncontrolled, would offer the
same protection to them as Achille's heel offered to him.
This need for minimal protection became an accepted fact as a result of WWII. There was an
increased recognition of the national policies relating to controlled coastal waters, and, except for the
right of innocent passage, such recognition was taken full advantage of. The acceptance of the ex-
tended control by riparians breached the hull of the total freedom vessel.
Rushing through that breach were numerous attempts (successful and otherwise) to extend
national jurisdictions even further. For example, President Truman's proclamation extended juris-
diction to the continental shelf. In 1952, certain Latin American countries went so far as to declare
a 200 mile jurisdiction. Finally, in 1958 and 1960, the United Nations established a conference on
the law of the sea for purposes of codifying the laws which had developed up to that point.
The Law of the Sea Conference ratified Truman's proclamation on the continental shelf ex-
ploitation and affirmed the traditional freedom (with that single inroad) with respect to navigation,
fishing, laying cables, etc. The one inroad proved not to be enough for resource-greedy nations.
Throughout the 1960s, the technologically precocious continued their unilateral extension of na-
tional jurisdiction. To date, such territorial jurisdictions have continued to expand, motivated pri-
marily by commercial concerns. Few appear to rate amelioration of man's impact on the ocean
environment at the top of their list of priorities. See WHO PROTECTS THE OCEANS? (J. Hargrove
ed. 1975).
59 Customary principles of international law have traditionally reflected the notion that all na-
tions shall enjoy unconstrained use of the oceans. See, eg., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-26 (2d ed. 1973); C. COLOMBUS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 47-
86 (6th ed. 1967); I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 588-94 (8th ed. H. Hawterpacht ed. 1955).
The Convention on the High Seas provides that "The high seas being open to all nations, no state
may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty." Convention on the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High
Seas Convention].
60 The "flags of convenience" problem has been elsewhere discussed in considerable detail. See,
e.g., Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels--An Environmental Tragedy: The Legal
Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions and Coastal States, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 37, 50-65 (1980).
Article 5 of the High Seas Convention provides, inter alia, that "each State shall fix the condi-
tions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the
right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly .. "
High Seas Convention, supra note 59, art. V. Thus, a "flag of convenience" has been defined as "the
flag of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under
conditions which, for whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are
registering the vessels." B. BOCZEK, supra note 56, at 2.
Hence, the right to determine precisely which criteria must be met for a ship to be entitled to
nationality has traditionally been deemed to be a matter exclusively within the province of the do-
mestic law of individual states; nationality of a vessel has been evidenced solely by the flag, proper
documentation and registration. Dempsey & Helling, supra, at 63.
Nevertheless, considerable controversy has arisen over this long accepted international rule.
Criticisms include increased national security risks in times of crisis, oppressive working conditions
for seafarers, and increased environmental pollution. Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of Mini-
mum Standards for Foreign Flag Ships, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 54,56 (1980). Flag of convenience
states have been criticized because of their failure to enforce international standards. See Juda, supra




before commodities as toxic as oil were transported in such vast quanti-
ties on the open seas.
III. THE IMO AND COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT
UNDER OILPOL 54
A. Structure and Function of the IMO
The Western maritime powers recognized the benefits of interna-
tional shipping regulations during World War II, when the Allies partici-
pated in the Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime
Authority. Although both bodies were dissolved shortly after the war,
their successes in encouraging technical and navigational cooperation
prompted the United States and the ship-owning nations of Western Eu-
rope to press for a permanent maritime organization. At their urging,
the United Nations Maritime Conference was convened in 1948, and in a
mere seventeen days6 1 produced the Convention on the Inter-Govern-
1, 4 (1978). Fleets of these vessels bearing flags of convenience are sometimes characterized by their
poor condition, inadequately trained crews, and frequent collisions. Too often, this has resulted in
oil spills and water pollution. See generally OECO Study on Flags of Convenience, 4 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 231 (1973); Wittig, supra note 56, at 115.
These problems are thought to be a result of the absence of effective control of the flag state over
the vesse, resulting from the lack of connection of the flag state with a ship flying its flag. Thus, the
concept of the genuine link was adopted in Article 5 of the High Seas Convention: "There must
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise
its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag."
High Seas Convention, supra note 59, art. 5.
But there is no agreement as to what constitutes a genuine link and no agreement as to its utility
in ensuring adequate regulation. See McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order
at Sea and the Nationality of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25, 105 (1960). Therefore, until the legal
notion of a "genuine link" becomes a reality, the focus should be on the need to ensure adequate
protection for the marine environment by enforcement of international regulations.
61 Padwa, The Curriculum of IMCO, 14 INT'L ORGANIZATION 524, 529 (1968). The IMCO was
conceived of as far back as 1946. The organization which planted the seed initially was the Tempo-
rary Transport and Communications Commission. It recommended to the Economic and Social
Council ("ECOSOC") that the United Nations sponsor "a world-wide inter-governmental shipping
organization." The principal tasks of such an organization would be to provide for exchange of
information, to determine the need for revising existing agreements and conventions, to adopt new
agreements and conventions, and to deal on behalf of shipping with other organizations in the field
of communications. Johnson, IMCO: The First Four Years (1959-1962), 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 31
(1963).
Pursuant to that recommendation, the Council requested the Commission to further inquire
into the establishment of such an organization in June of 1946. The forthcoming suggestion was that
the Secretary-General of the United Nations convene an international conference to establish an
organization with the above-described functions in mind. Therefore, on February 19 the United
Nations Maritime Conference convened, attended by:
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mental Maritime Consultative Organization.6' The Convention entered
into force ten years later, and created the world's leading technical forum
on shipping safety and marine pollution.63 In 1982 the name of the
agency was changed to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO).
64
The 1948 Convention outlines IMO's institutional framework as a
consultative and advisory body on maritime safety,6 5 and more recently,
marine pollution.66 As expressed in that agreement, the functions of the
organization are principally "consultative and advisory." IMO convenes

































Numerous other governments were represented as well as numerous inter-governmental organiza-
tions. Id. at 32.
62 Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 17, 1958, 9
U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
The Convention listed the purposes of the Organization:
(a) To provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of governmental
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping en-
gaged in international trade, and to encourage the general adoption of the highest practica-
ble standards in matters concerning maritime safety and efficiency of navigation;
(b) To encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by Gov-
ernments affecting shipping engaged in international trade so as to promote the availability
of shipping services to the commerce of the world without discrimination; assistance and
encouragement given by a Government for the development of its national shipping and
for purposes of security does not in itself constitute discrimination provided that such
assistance and encouragement is not based on measures designed to restrict the freedom of
shipping of all flags to take part in international trade;
(c) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters concerning unfair restric-
tive practices by shipping concerns in accordance with Part II;
Id., art. I.
63 Thirteen years after the initiation of the Organization by recommendation, the first session of
IMO was held. It appears that one of the greatest reasons for the delay in the formation of the
Organization was its anticipated participation in the commercial aspects of shipping. In fact, it was
proposed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden (without success) that the purpose of the Organization
be merely technical with no participation whatsoever in the commercial area. Johnson, supra note
61, at 39.
64 Throughout this article, the agency will be referred to as IMO, even though it did not assume
that acronym until 1982.
65 Convention supra note 62, art. 2. See generally Silverstein, Technological Politics and Mari-
time Affairs-Comparative Participation in the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 367 (1976).




approval of member states. The framework is similar to that of other
United Nations specialized agencies, such as the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization ("ICAO"), in that a nominally supreme Assembly
defers to an executive Council.6 7
Membership in IMO is open to all United Nations members that
accede to the Convention. 68 The organization consists of deliberative,
policy-making organs such as the Assembly, 69 the Council,70 several per-
67 Tourtellot, Membership Criteria for the ICAO Council: A Proposal for Reform, 11 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 51, 56 (1982).
68 Convention supra note 62, art. 6, 57.
69 Membership in the Assembly is open to all members of IMO, which at last count numbered
over one hundred. See Convention, supra note 62, art. 13; R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra
note 25, at 51.
The Assembly meets every two years for regular sessions, at which it recommends that mem-
bers adopt new regulations promulgated by the Council and its committees, and refers matters
within the scope of the organization to the Council. Convention, supra note 62, art. 14, 16(i), 160).
This constitutes the extent of the Assembly's powers. Although it enjoys nominally supreme status
within the organization, its usual function is to approve proposals referred to it by other organs. R.
M'GoNIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 44. A possible source of power is the Assembly's
responsibility for electing members to two powerful policy-making organs, the Council and the Mar-
itime Safety Committee ("MSC"), but many positions are predetermined by technical qualifications
stipulated by the Convention. See Convention, supra note 62, art. 16(d), 17, 28.
70 The Council is IMO's most powerful organ because it is a small, highly-integrated body with
continuous authority. When the Assembly is not in session, which is most of the time, the Council
assumes nearly all its organizational functions. Convention, supra note 62, art. 27. The Council also
appoints the secretary-general and other administrative personnel, as well as supervises the commit-
tees that formulate new regulations. Id, art. 22, 23. The Council does not enjoy the quasi-legislative
powers that permit other specialized agencies to automatically bind member-states to new rules; but
at IMO it reigns supreme. C. ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAW-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIAL-
IZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 72 (1973).
Membership qualifications for the Council have been used to maintain the influence of the west-
ern ship-owning nations at the expense of developing nations. Although numerically superior in the
Assembly, developing nations encounter difficulty in obtaining Council seats. The disadvantage
dates back to the United Nations Maritime Conference in 1948.
Issues at the Conference were often determined by the Main Working Party, composed primar-
ily of maritime countries that had participated in the wartime shipping organizations. Padwa, supra
note 61, at 530. These same countries were instrumental in formulating the so-called "Washington
Draft" of the IMO Convention, which carried unusual weight at the Conference. See id. at 531;
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 4/1 (1946). The Main Working Party consisted of Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Padwa, supra note 61, at 530 n.45.
The Main Working Party determined that geographical representation was an unsatisfactory
criteria for membership in the Council. Id at 531. The finding was not unusual for specialized
agencies, where the equity of balanced geographical representation often conflicts with either a need
for technological expertise possessed by only a small number of states or the desire of an elite to
maintain control in an international forum. See Tourtellot, supra note 67, at 59.
The result was Article 17 of the original Convention, which provided three criteria for member-
ship in the Council: 1) nations with "the largest interest in providing international shipping serv-
ices," or ship ownership; 2) nations with "the largest interest in international seaborne trade," or
port facilities; and 3) those selected from the membership at large. Convention, supra note 62, art.
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17(a), (b), (c). Of the Council's 16 members, six were to be elected from the shipowning category, six
from the seaborne trade category, and four from the general membership of the Assembly. Id.
The maritime nations, thus insured that shipowners and their trading partners would be assured
membership on the policy-making Council, further stacked the deck by requiring that the Main
Working Party, not the Assembly, determine membership in the first Council. Despite objections
that the group was using out-dated statistics and improper methods, the Main Working Party went
ahead and named itself to the first Council. See Padwa, supra note 61, at 532. Of the 12 stipulated
seats, nine were filled by members of the Main Working Party. Convention, supra note 62, App. I.
The countries named to the Council who were also members of the Main Working Party were:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France, India, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Article 18 perpetuated this hold on the Council by giving these members responsibility for
determining membership qualifications before subsequent assembly sessions. Convention, supra note
62, art. 18.
As IMO's membership expanded during the 1960s and 1970s to include many developing coun-
tries, the Assembly amended the Convention to provide for more equitable geographical representa-
tion. R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 46. In 1964, the Council was enlarged to 18
members: six representing the largest shipowning countries, six representing nations with the largest
interest in seaborne trade, and six from the Assembly's general membership. Amendments to Arti-
cles 17 and 18 of the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
Sept. 15, 1964, 607 U.N.T.S. 276. This modest concession was supplemented by a 1974 amendment
providing for 24 seats in the Council, 12 of which remained with the traditional maritime powers
and 12 from the Assembly at large with consideration for geographic representation. R.
M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 46. One commentator believes that this last amend-
ment, which entered into force in 1978, has ended "the formal dominance exercised by the developed
maritime states." Id. What must be remembered, however, is that less than 12% of the Assembly's
membership exercises disproportionate power in the Council on a continuing basis by virtue of shi-
pownership and interest in seaborne trade. Developing nations, who have a substantial interest in
maritime affairs, as consumers of shipping services, and constitute the majority of IMO members,
must content themselves with at most 50% of Council seats.
Because the Council cannot promulgate new regulations, but merely recommend them to mem-
ber-states through the Assembly, the ultimate policy-making organ of IMO remains the interna-
tional conference. Convention, supra note 62, art. 3. These conferences are usually initiated by the
committees, who prepare a tentative agenda. The conferences, which require approval of two-thirds
of the invited delegates, enter into force only for those nations explicitly assenting to them. R.
M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 49. Such conference produce conventions such as the
International Load Line Convention and the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL/73).
Because IMO technically exists outside the United Nations, it must propose new maritime regu-
lations at conferences and not within the IMO Assembly and Council. As Article 3(a) of the IMCO
Convention, 1948, reads, the organization shall promulgate international agreements by the conven-
tion process, a process shared by other specialized agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation
Organization ("ICAO") and the World Health Organization ("WHO"). See C. ALEXANDROWICZ,
supra note 70, at 42.
A conference convened by an international organization proposes new law in two strikingly
different ways. The traditional method has been that employed by IMO, to present the conference
with a draft treaty for its consideration and hopefully, adoption. More recently, however, interna-
tional organizations have promulgated international law by quasi-legislation.
Treaties are agreements of limited application between nations that require the express consent
of parties as a condition precedent of their effectiveness. This consent principle requires interna-
tional law to defer to national sovereignty. A treaty adopted by an international conference enters
into force only when it has been ratified by the national governments of member states. Those states
that do not ratify may not be bound by the treaty provisions. Id. at 72. The quasi-legislative pro-
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manent committees, 71 and an administrative organ, the Secretariat.
72
Decisions by each organ are made by majority vote.73
Although most IMO organs are open to all members, participation
cess, however, promulgates regulations that are automatically binding on member states unless it is
expressly rejected. Ia at 47. Although a 1965 convention permits IMO to use quasi-legislative
methods when promoting shipping convenience, it must use the more cumbersome treaty method
when considering marine pollution. Id. at 63.
Because of this peculiar division of powers, the average lapse between approval of a convention
and its entry into force has been between three and five years. INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME
CONSULTATIVE ORGANIzATIoN, THE WORK OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CON-
SULTATIVE ORGANIZATION ("IMCO") ON PROBLEMS RELATING TO MARINE POLLUTION 6 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as WORK OF IMCO].
71 Article 12 of the Convention established the Maritime Safety Committee and permits the
organization to establish such other committees as it sees fit. Convention, supra note 62, art. 12. As
IMO's work has expanded into the fields of marine pollution and industrial development, new
groups have been created, such as the Marine Environmental Protection Committee, the Legal Com-
mittee, and the Technical Cooperation Committee. The committees are responsible to the Assembly
but are supervised by the Council. See R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 45.
The Maritime Safety Committee ("MSC") was created by the 1948 Convention and, until 1978,
imposed membership requirements on nations wishing to participate. At least eight members of the
MSC were required to represent the largest shipowning countries. Convention, supra note 62, art.
28. As the MSC was IMO's primary technical body where most regulations were drafted, this re-
quirement prevented many member-states from effectively participating in the organization. R
M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 47. The MSC is now open to all member-states, as are
the other IMO committees. Ia at n.8.
The Legal Committee was created in the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster to propose major
changes in maritime liability law. Originally an ad hoc body, the Legal Committee achieved equal
status with the MSC in 1978. Id. at n.10. It also maintains liaisons with other United Nations
agencies, such as the Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Council on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"). Ia at 47.
Closely related to the aims of UNCTAD is the Technical Cooperation Committee ("TCC"),
which will attain equal status with the other committees when the 1977 amendments enter into
force. See IMCO Res. A.358 (IX) (1977). By providing assistance for countries with infant shipping
industries, the TCC has increased the interest of developing countries in IMO.
Long a subcommittee of the MSC, the Marine Environmental Protection Committee
("MEPC") becomes a principal organ with the entry into force of the 1975 amendments to the
Convention. See IMCO Res. A.297 (VIII) (1973). With the entry into force of the 1973 Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the MEPC will enjoy powers unprecedented within IMO.
The MEPC will be able to quasi-legislatively promulgate new regulations under the 1973 Convention
that will bind member-states without their explicit assent. R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra
note 25, at 58. This tacit acceptance will enable IMO to respond more quickly and effectively to the
problems of marine pollution.
The open membership policy for these committees should enable developing countries, which
had before been excluded from important policy decisions in the Council and the MSC, to partici-
pate more fully in the functions of IMO. Convention, supra note 62, art. 12.
72 The 1948 Convention entrusts the Secretariat with administrative functions only. Conven-
tion, supra note 62, art. 34, 35. Traditionally its role has been non-political. Faced with an uninter-
ested majority of members in the 1960's and the problem of oil tanker pollution, two secretaries-
general, Sir Colin Goad and C.P. Srisastava, the latter of whom is currently in office, have worked to
extend IMCO's influence. R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 50.
73 Convention, supra note 62, art. 43.
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in the more powerful ones, such as the Council and the Maritime Safety
Committee, has traditionally been determined on the basis of special
qualifications set forth in the Convention. It has been alleged that by
limiting access to important decisionmaking arenas, the IMO Conven-
tion has permitted a small group of developed maritime countries to
maintain disproportionate influence within the organization.74
IMO is the first international body devoted exclusively to maritime
matters. As a specialized agency of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), IMO submits draft conventions to the world community-
many of which seek to prevent vessel source marine pollution." Today,
more than 120 nations, virtually the entire world maritime community,
are members of IMO.
The organization's founding convention directs IMO to meet its
objectives in two ways: (1) by providing an institutional framework for
the adoption of international maritime law; and (2) by promoting imple-
mentation and enforcement of these standards by member states.76
74 See generally R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 25, at 255-314; Padwa, supra note 61.
Throughout its 24 year tenure, the influence of the shipowning nations may have been insured by the
Convention; it concentrated institutional power in the executive council, where maritime interests
prevail. Recent amendments to the Convention have, however, ended the formal dominance of the
maritime nations by opening participation to developing countries. R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER,
supra note 25, at 46. Nevertheless, IMO has been called a "shipowners' club" of the western ship-
owning nations. Id. at 264. Open membership for the committees, which are instrumental in pre-
paring international conferences and new regulations, is a hopeful sign that all IMO members will
have equal access to policy-making arenas. Whether these structural changes will substantially alter
informal power relationships within the organization, however, is a question which must be reserved
for other commentators. For now, these changes may induce more developing nations that IMO is
an organization receptive to their interests and perspectives.
75 WORK OF IMCO, supra note 70.
76 Id. IMO acts as a depository for a multitude of multilateral conventions status of multilateral
conventions in respect of which the inter-governmental maritime consultative organization or its
Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions. Misc. (82) I.E. (Dec. 31, 1981). These
include the following:
(1) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
(2) Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974
(3) Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
(4) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954
(5) Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965
(6) International Convention on Load Lines, 1966
(7) International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollu-
tion Casualties, 1969
(8) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
(9) Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
(10) International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fundfor Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971
(11) Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971
(12) Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships, 1973




In the past ten years, IMO has achieved its first objective by framing
several major conventions addressing the problem of vessel-source pollu-
tion. Among these are OILPOL 54 and MARPOL 73/78. Compliance
and enforcement of the antipollution sections of OILPOL 54 will be dis-
cussed here. The implementation of MARPOL 73/78 follows later in
this article.77
B. Compliance and Enforcement Under OILPOL 54
In April of 1954, the United Kingdom convened a conference to
address the growing problem of maritime pollution by ocean vessels.
The multilateral agreement which resulted was the International Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil ("OILPOL
54").78 Although marine pollution caused by collisions and other acci-
dents was beginning to concern the world community, OILPOL 54 was
principally aimed at pollution resulting from routine de-ballasting-
which was, and still is, the principal 'source of vessel pollution. 79 The
Convention was administered by the United Kingdom until IMO was
established, in 1959.
OILPOL 54 (as amended in 1962, 1969 and 1971) seeks to diminish
ocean pollution by establishing zones extending fifty miles from land in
which intentional discharges of oil and oily mixtures are totally prohib-
ited. Prohibited zones include the Red Sea, Black Sea and the Mediterra-
nean, and 100 miles from the coastline of any state which has established
a prohibited zone. Article III of OILPOL 54 prohibits all intentional
discharges by tankers of oil or oily mixtures (a) of more than sixty litres
per mile traveled by the ship, (b) of more than 1/15,000 of the vessel's
total cargo capacity, and (c) within fifty miles of land. Article XIV re-
quires that vessels keep oil record books to reflect compliance with spe-
cific requirements that ensure that all transfers or discharges, and reasons
therefor, are carefully handled. The Convention also established the
(14) International Convention for Safe Containers, 1972
(15) Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), 1976
(16) Operating Agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT),
1976
(17) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mat-
ter, 1972
(18) The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
(19) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by
the Protocol of 1978 Relating thereto (MARPOL 1973/78)
77 See infra notes 181-194 and accompanying text.
78 Convention Respecting Prevention of Oil Pollution, opened for signature May 12, 1954, 12
U.S.T. 2989, I.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as OILPOL 54].
79 MARPOL 73/78, 4 IMO NEws 10 (1983).
As of July 22, 1982, the following 68 nations were Contracting Parties to OILPOL 54 (as
amended in 1962 and 1979):
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right of any port state to inspect oil record books. As one commentator
has noted, "It is one thing to establish a ban on specified discharge of oil;
it is quite another to ensure that offenders will be detected, identified and
prosecuted."8 °
Under OILPOL 54, every contracting government is obligated to
undertake "appropriate measures" to ensure that the Convention's re-
quirements are "so far as is reasonable and practicable" applied to vessels
registered in its territories, and unregistered vessels having its national-
ity.81 The penalties imposed upon such vessels must be sufficiently "ade-
quate in severity to discourage any such unlawful discharges and shall
not be less than the penalties which may be imposed under the law of
that territory in respect of the same infringements within the territorial
sea." 82 Further, every contracting party is obligated to report to the
Algeria Liberia
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As has been indicated, Article VI of OILPOL 54 requires that each Contracting Party shall
report to IMO the penalties actually imposed for violations of the Convention.
80 E. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDROSPACE 138 (1971).
81 OILPOL 54, supra note 78, art. z.
82 Id., art. 6(2). In 1981, the IMO Assembly reminded member nations "to take all necessary
legislative steps to ensure, as a matter of highest priority, that penalties for violation of convention
Oil Pollution
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IMO the penalties it actually imposes for each violation. 3
When a nation has been informed that its vessel has violated the
provisions of the Convention, it must investigate the matter. If it is con-
vinced that sufficient evidence exists to institute legal proceedings against
the owner or the master of the vessel, it must initiate such proceedings as
promptly as possible. It must also promptly notify both the IMO and the
government reporting the violation, and inform them of the "action
taken as a consequence of the information communicated.
8 4
In 1961, IMO asked the contracting governments to OILPOL 54 for
their views and experience as to how well the Convention was working.
Most responded that they had "experienced difficulties in some form or
other in ensuring observance of the requirements of the Convention."85
Both the United Kingdom and West Germany had experienced difficulty
in proving violations occurring beyond their territorial waters, particu-
larly "when proceedings have to be taken in the country of registry of the
vessel."86
Under Resolution 15 of the 1962 International Conference on the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, IMO was charged with produc-
ing reports on the effectiveness of OILPOL 54, based on member states'
reports and the number of successful prosecutions for contravention of
the treaty. In 1973, IMO appealed to members to submit information
regarding their compliance and enforcement actions required by
OILPOL 54.87
In 1977, IMO passed a resolution reminding its members of their
reporting requirements under OILPOL 54. The Resolution identified
discharge sightings, aerial photographs, and voluntary inspections as rea-
sonable evidence that violations have occurred. Also, it reminded both
coastal and port states of their obligation to report offenses to flag states.
Further, flag states were reminded of their obligation to investigate every
such report: "[The flag state] should investigate the matter and, if appro-
priate, proceed against the master or owner of the ship, informing the
reporting States and the Organization of the action it has taken and its
requirements relating to the prevention of marine pollution from ships specified under the laws of
their countries, particularly financial sanctions against those who operate polluting ships, are severe
enough to discourage violations of such requirements. IMCO RES. A.499(XII) (Jan. 14, 1982). See
also IMCO Res. A.412(XI) (Nov. 15, 1979).
83 OILPOL 54, supra note 78, art. 6(3).
84 Id., art. 10(2).
85 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION, 1962 INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL 2 (1961).
86 Id. at 3.
87 MPC/Circ. 62 (June 26, 1973).
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outcome as soon as possible, and in any case within six months."88
The IMO Assembly also adopted a resolution in 1977 calling upon
the Secretariat to compile reports addressing the effectiveness of
OILPOL 54 and "the number of successful and unsuccessful prosecu-
tions for contravention of the Convention."8 9 It further called upon the
Secretary-General to compile a "comprehensive list of the reports of con-
traventions of the Conventions received from Contracting Governments
and indicate whether the other Contracting Governments have investi-
gated the reports and the results of any proceedings taken when such
results are shown."90 These repeated requests have never been fulfilled.
This author's in camera inspection of the compliance and enforce-
ment records at the IMO international headquarters in London during
the Summer of 1982 revealed that of the sixty-eight nations obligated to
comply with the OILPOL 54 reporting requirements, fewer than one-
third have actually filed such reports. 91 Most have ignored the require-
ment altogether. Many of the reports fied provided little meaningful in-
formation. The United Kingdom was the first nation to file such a report
in late 1976, almost twenty years after OILPOL 54 entered into force.9"
88 IMCO Res. A.391(X), at 5 (Dec. 1, 1977).
89 IMCO Res. A.392(X), at 1 (Dec. 1, 1977).
90 Id. Under Resolution 15 of the International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, 1962, IMO was charged with producing reports on the effectiveness of OILPOL 54,
based on member states reports and the number of successful prosecutions for contravention of the
treaty. The responsibility of states to report to IMO its enforcement of and compliance with
OILPOL 54 was reiterated by MPC/Circ. 62 (1973), and IMCO Res. A.391(x) (Dec. 1, 1977).
IMCO Res. A.392(X) (Dec. 1, 1977) repeated this appeal to coastal and port states, as well as flag
states, to submit regular reports to IMO immediately following any action taken under OILPOL 54
so as to enable the organization to fulfill its obligations to act as an informational clearinghouse.
Further, it again requested the Secretary General to prepare a comprehensive list of referrals re-
ported by member states and actions taken by flag states in response thereto, not less than once a
year. IMCO Res. A.392(X) (Dec. 1, 1977). Another resolution insisted "The reports from reporting
States should be matched against those of the relevant Administrations, and summaries should be
circulated at every session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee." IMCO Res.
A.391(X) (Dec. 1, 1977). Apparently, this has never been done.
91 This inspection was performed over a period of several weeks during August and September
of 1982 by the author and his research assistant, Mark Traphagen (J.D. candidate, University of
Denver College of Law). The summaries compiled, which are spread throughout subsequent foot-
notes, were selectively extracted from the documents filed in the library of the IMO headquarters,
101-104 Piccadilly, London, WIV OAE. The author accepts sole responsibility for any inadvertent
inaccuracies which may exist in these summaries.
92 OILPOL 54 was adopted on May 12, 1954, and entered into force on July 26, 1958. Since
then, only 19 nations have filed OILPOL 54 reports of any kind with the IMO. Moreover, the
reports for those nations only cover discrete time periods:
Australia (1977-80)
Bahamas (1981)




Although one would expect that land-locked nations such as Aus-
tria and Switzerland would have nothing to report to the IMO, it is nev-
ertheless quite surprising that almost fifty OILPOL 54 signators have
never filed a single report discussing their compliance and enforcement
activities with the IMO. At the very least, one must conclude that many
nations ignore their reporting responsibilities under the Convention.
Perhaps a number of nations which never report, adopt that approach
because they have discovered nothing to report, indicating that they may
be ignoring their compliance and enforcement obligations under
OILPOL 54 as well.
The following data has been selectively extracted and tabulated from
the reports which have been filed.93 It divides the compliance and en-
forcement activities into three categories: (1) port state enforcement;
(2) coastal state referrals; and (3) flag state enforcement. The following
scenario demonstrates the three categories of enforcement. As an exam-
ple, a Liberian flag tanker owned by a United States multinational corpo-
ration laden with Saudi crude may deposit its cargo in Rotterdam. A
French mirage jet patrolling the French coast might spot a trail of oil
several nautical miles long following the tanker, strongly suggesting an
intentional deballasting. It might photograph the discharge several times
German Democratic Republic (1979-80)
Greece (1975-80)













93 This data reflects only the referrals and violations reported by the referring governments and
the flag states. Thus, the conclusions drawn are only as good as the reporting itself.
Some reports include violations for a longer time period than do other reports. Moreover, the
total number of violations reported by referring countries for a flag state does not equal the number
of violations reported by that flag state itself. In addition, it is not clear if each report represents new
referrals and new violations or if some referrals and violations have been reported more than once as
a summary report for a several year period. Additionally, many states have not standardized the
type of data they file.
Because of these and other problems, conclusions from the data have to be drawn cautiously.
For example, the number of violations by a flag state could be a reflection of actual violations but
also of reporting over a longer time period, overlap in reporting and a greater number of tankers
actually shipping oil by that state.
Despite these limitations, the author feels the data gives a general indication of which nations
have the most violations and how well countries are meeting their OILPOL 54 obligations.
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to provide evidentiary documentation. If the Liberian vessel enters a
French port, such as Le Havre, governmental officials might serve the
Master of the vessel with a summons to appear in French domestic
courts for violating French pollution laws. If the vessel posted a bond
covering the estimated cost of any fine, it would then be allowed to set
sail, while judicial proceedings began in the French courts. This is port
state enforcement.94  France would likely report to IMO the date and
nature of the violation, the flag of the vessel, and information concerning
the penalty, if any, ultimately imposed.
But if, for example, the same vessel never entered a French port, but
instead continued through French territorial waters back to the Persian
Gulf, the French government would likely have no opportunity to engage
in port state enforcement. It would instead, refer the problem (and sup-
porting evidence) back to the state of registry-in this case, Liberia.
France would then likely report to IMO the referral, as well as the re-
sponse, if any, proferred by Liberian authorities. This is an example of a
coastal state referral.
Finally, Liberia might itself report any enforcement action taken
against the vessel (or its crew) back to France and the IMO. This is an
example of flag state enforcement.
1. Port State Enforcement
Port states frequently exercise jurisdiction over both OILPOL 54
and domestic legislation violations which occur within their territorial
waters." The violations may include either unlawful, environmentally
harmful discharges, or oil record book deficiencies. They may involve
violations by foreign or domestic flag vessels. The port state authorities
may insist upon the posting of a bond by a vessel which has committed
an alleged violation, pending judicial resolution of the question. Upon a
finding that the violation did in fact occur, the port state may assess a
penalty (usually a fine) against the vessel, the Master and/or the respon-
sible crew members.
As of 1982, the following fourteen states reported their port state
94 Port state enforcement has been defined to include the exercise of a state's "enforcement juris-
diction over foreign ships in its ports in respect of offenses against international rules and standards
even if committed in sea areas beyond its coastal jurisdiction." K. HAKAPAA, MARINE POLLUTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (1971).
95 See, e.g., Greenwald, Pollution Control at the Maritime Frontier: The Limits of State Extrater-
ritorial Power, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 747 (1979); Levandowski, Civil Liabilityfor Oil Pollution
Damage on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 397 (1978); Versteeg, The




enforcement practices to the IMO, pursuant to the reporting obligations
of OILPOL 54: Australia, United Kingdom, Chile, France, East Ger-
many, West Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Ku-
wait, Norway, and United States. Certain nations, however, were more
conscientious than others in reporting violations from year to year and in
reporting violations in any given year. Table II shows the number of
violations reported by each country for each year. Notice that no nation
has reported every year. Notice also the wide variation in numbers of
reported violations among countries. Were there really 175 more viola-
tions in Japanese waters during 1979 than there were in United States
waters?
TABLE II
COUNTRY 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 TOTAL
Japan - - - 97 176 188 - 461
Greece 85 65 79 56 69 58 - 412
U.K. 53 49 56 37 49 46 - 290
Australia - 30 30 57 53 18 - 188
Kuwait - 50 - 24 - 57 19 150
W. Germany - - - - - 33 33
Chile - - - - 27 27
Israel - - - - - 12 5 17
France - - - 11 - - - -
E. Germany - - - - 7 - - 7
Norway - - - - 3 6 - 9
Ireland 1 - - - - 4 - 5
Hong Kong - - - - - 1 2 3
U.S.A. - - - - 1 - - 1
TOTAL 139 176 143 282 358 390 86 1584
Several statistical trends indicate greater concern by the participat-
ing nations. With regard to the reporting and enforcement obligations of
OILPOL 54, the overall trend suggests greater participation. In 1975,
three countries reported 139 violations. In 1980, nine nations reported
390 violations. The low 1981 figures may, however, be due'to the lack of
availability of the information (which was collected at IMO headquarters
during the Summer of 1982), rather than the non-participation of certain
countries. 1980 was the year in which the largest number of violations
were reported. This may be explained by the fact that some of the great-
est tanker disasters in history occurred in 1979. Perhaps these disasters
prompted nations to take the antipollution regulations of OILPOL 54
more seriously.
The nations reporting the most violations did not necessarily impose
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the highest fines.96 Table III notes the fines imposed by the top five
countries.
TABLE III
Fines in U.S. Dollars Imposed by Country by Year
(Only Those Countries Reporting Three or More
Years Are Listed)
COUNTRY 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 TOTAL
Greece 348,485 109,857 317,516 130,169 318,305 322,322 - 1,546,654
Kuwait - - - 184,000 363,363 177,207 102,470 824,040
U.K. 181,111 100,936 115,106 * 102,479 - 499,632
Japan - - - 37,552 73,295 32,000** - 142,847
Australia - 15,556 22,147 * 12,331 - 50,034
*Total fines imposed were not available.
*More fines are known to have been imposed, but this was the only figure available.
In addition to the total fines imposed by a country, another indica-
tion of how seriously the pollution problem is viewed is the average fine
imposed per violation. Table IV shows the average annual fines imposed
in United States dollars by each country by year. Only those countries
reporting three or more years are listed.
TABLE IV
Average Fine Imposed in U.S. Dollars by Country
AVERAGE FINE
COUNTRY 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 FOR ALL YEARS
Kuwait - - - 7,667 6,490 8,266 5,393 7,070
Greece 4,628 1,690 4,019 2,324 4,514 5,557 - 3,849
U.K. 3,293 3,256 2,055 - 1,970 - - 2,636
Australia - 673 831 - 1,370 - - 1,042
Japan 387 403 509* - 443
*Fines imposed against Japanese vessels only
Reporting nations tended to be much more strict when dealing with
96 The exchange rates used in this analysis were taken from the following sources:
The effective rate as reported in F. PICK, 1977-1979 PICK'S CURRENCY YEARBOOK (1981) was
used for figuring U.S. dollar equivalency for the years 1975-79 for the following countries: Norway,
Kuwait, Japan, Greece, Hong Kong.
The foreign exchange rates reported in 47 STANDARD & POOR'S TRADE AND SECURITIES STA-
TISICS, BANKING AND FINANCE (No. 4, 1981) were used for the years 1975-79 for the following
countries: United Kingdom, France, East Germany, West Germany, and Japan.
The average foreign exchange rates reported in 49 STANDARD & POOR'S STATISTICAL SERVICE
CURRENT STATISTICS (No. 1, 1983) for the years 1980-1981 were used to figure U.S. dollar




violations by vessels flying their own flags than with violations by vessels
of other countries. Between 1975 and 1981, the thirteen participating
countries reported a total of 1,574 violations by ships belonging to at
least fifty-three countries. Thirty-six percent of those violations were
cited by ten reporting countries against their own vessels. This leaves the
remaining sixty-four percent of all violations to be divided among eighty-
three percent of the non-reporting, non-participating countries.
To illustrate the point, during the seven year period involved in this
study, eleven nations reported 113 violations by Greek ships while
Greece itself logged 216 violations against its own ships. Sixty-six per-
cent of all violations by Greek ships were reported by Greece itself. Simi-
larly, the United Kingdom found 129 violations by its own ships while
other countries claimed United Kingdom vessels were involved in only
sixty-five violations. The most extreme examples are Japan, where ninety
percent of all complaints against Japanese tankers were filed by the Japa-
nese government, and Australia, where the only complaints against Aus-
tralian ships reported were by the Australians themselves.
One can only speculate as to why this situation exists. First, a coun-
try may be more sensitive about the actions of its own fleet than those of
other countries. Second, it is likely that a greater number of a country's
own ships frequent its ports, thereby increasing the likelihood of pollu-
tion detection. Third, it is possible that it is easier to enforce regulations
against a country's own vessels because the evidentiary and jurisdictional
impediments are diminished. Any jurisdictional problems regarding en-
forcement are virtually eliminated when a port state sanctions the unlaw-
ful conduct of a vessel flying its flag. Finally, while the port state may
refer a violation to a foreign state regarding a foreign flag vessel, there is
absolutely nowhere to refer a domestic vessel's violation to but to the
enforcement and judicial authorities of the port state.
Whatever the reason, port states have clearly been tougher on ves-
sels flying the home flag than they have been on vessels of foreign na-
tions. Table V evidences the breakdown of self-imposed complaints.
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Ships in Its Own Fleet:
1976 1977 1978 1979
33 41 31 37
- - 18 54
18 17 22 23
12 8 7 20













70 67 66 72 137 131 13 566
The foreign flag vessels in which port state enforcement was most
pronounced between 1975 and 1981 are listed below, in Table V. Port












1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 TOTAL
11 26 16 29 36 49 7 174
7 13 6 34 44 33 13 150
- 12 11 12 25 33 20 113
14 8 12 18 13 - - 65
4 - 8 11 9 - - 32
6 3 6 2 3 5 - 25
2 - 10 3 5 - - 20
3 4 2 8 - - - 17
3 - 3 6 - - - 14
There are many factors that may influence the total number of com-
plaints against a country. Table VII attempts to display size and age of
















COUNTRY NO. OF PERCENT OF PERCENT PERCENT OF COMPLAINTS
COMPLAINTS WORLD OF FLEET WORLD TO FLEET
1975-81 FLEET IN OVER 10 COMPLAINTS SIZE/RATIO
1975 YRS. OLD
IN 1976
Liberia 174 27.7 16 11.1 1:2.5
Panama 150 3.69 39 9.5 2.6:1
Greece 113 5.53 35 7.2 1.3:1
U.K. 65 10.73 11 4.1 1.2.6
Norway 32 8.92 6 2.0 1:4.5
Japan 14 11.68 5.7 .9 1:13
The age of the fleet appears to be a controlling factor. Panama and
Greece have the oldest fleets. Although other countries have larger
fleets, Panamanian and Greek flag vessels were responsible for many
more complaints.
Let us now examine the data for each of the port states which re-
ported their enforcement activities:
Australia
Australia has reported its port state enforcement activities regularly
since 1976. Each year Australia sanctions more violations by its domes-
tic flag vessels than by those of any other single country. No other re-
porting country, however, has sighted an Australian vessel with a
violation. Australian ships seem to be very well behaved in foreign wa-
ters. Forty-nine percent of the foreign vessels cited for violations in Aus-
tralian waters between 1976 and 1980 were from a "flag of convenience"
country. 97 Most fines were assessed under the Australian Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, which
enforces the provisions of the [OILPOL 54] Convention in respect of ships
outside Australian territorial waters and prescribes the area of the sea in
which Australian registered ships may not discharge oil or oily mixtures. It
also provides for inspection (including inspection of oil record books) of
ships (including ships of other Convention countries when in Australian
97 Complaints Against Foreign Vessels
Year Total Number Percentage of Flag of Convenience Registry
1976 18 15 83%
1977 22 17 77%
1978 50 11 22%
1979 33 20 61%
1980 15 4 27%
Seventy-two percent of the top five foreign countries reported as violators by Australia over the five
year period had open registry fleets.
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waters).
98
Penalties were also assessed under complementary legislation of the vari-
ous Australian states which independently sanction OILPOL 54 viola-
tions within Australian territorial waters.99
Australia frequently imposes fines directly upon the Master of the
offending vessel. For example, during 1977 it imposed a fine of ten thou-
sand Australian dollars against the Master of the Liberian vessel STALT
SHEAF for discharging twenty tons of bunker fuel at Ballask Point."°°
Presumably, the Australian government believes that holding those in
charge of the vessel responsible for its violations will more directly and
effectively punish those in the best position to put a stop to the ecological
damage. In addition, Australia frequently assesses clean up costs against
the vessel. 01
98 MEPC xii/1 1/4 (Oct. 15, 1979).
99 Id
100 MEPC x/13/1 Add. 1 (Nov. 3, 1978).
101 AUSTRALIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.
Source: MEPC VIII/12 Annex 1 (Nov. 4, 1977).
Fines (Australian $)
Flag of Vessels No. of Violations Range Mean Total
Australia 12 20-800 547 4920
U.K. 6 350-1200 870 4350
Liberia 5 100-1500 700 2100
India 3 100-250 175 350
Greece 2 500-850 675 130
Panama 2 210-450 330 660
TOTAL 30
All violations involved pollution discharges; none involved oil record book deficiencies.
Clean up costs assessed totaled Aust. $7532, or an average of Aust. $942 for each offense in
which such costs were imposed. The largest fine was Aust. $1500, assessed against a Liberian
tanker. Total fines imposed by Australia for 1976 would be equivalent to $15,556 in U.S. dollars,
with the average fine being $673.
AUSTRALIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1977.
Source: MEPC x/13/1 Add. 1 (Nov. 3, 1978).
Dispositions (Australian $)
No. of No. of cases in Range of
Flag of Vessel violations which fines imposed fines Mean Total fines
Australia 8 6 100-1000 633 3,800
U.K. 6 6 150-400 270 1,350
Greece 4 3 200-500 317 950
Liberia 4 4 100-10,000 2,863 11,450
Singapore 4 4 25-400 231 925
Panama 3 3 100-400 233 700
India 1 1 750 750 750
TOTAL 30 27 135-1980 748 $19,925
All violations involved oil discharges; none involved oil record book deficiencies.





The United Kingdom has reported its port state enforcement actions
regularly since 1975. Typically, such actions are taken under its domes-
from a low of Aust. $25 to a high of Aust. $10,000. The former involved the Singapore flag vessel
ARIANE which spilled 20 litres of diesel fuel into Freemantle Inner Harbour. The latter involved a
20 ton discharge of bunker fuel at Ballask Point by the Liberian flag vessel STALT SHEAF.
The three cases in which fines were assessed against vessel owners totaled Aust. $2,100 or a
mean of Aust. $700. This pattern may demonstrate a predeliction for personal responsibility on the
vessel's officers under Australian law.
Australia also assessed clean-up costs where appropriate. Such costs totaled Aust. $11,507, or a
mean of Aust. $371 per incident.
Total fines imposed by Australia in 1977 would be equivalent to $22,147 in U.S. dollars, with
the average fine being $831.
AUSTRALIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1978.
Source: MEPC XII/I 1/4 (Oct. 15, 1979).















No court action 3




Of the 48 fines imposed, the smallest was Aust. $50, and the largest was Aust. $10,000 plus, in
many cases, costs (which included legal fees, clean-up costs, court costs, etc.). In two instances,
Masters of violating vessels were fined $2,000 or three months imprisonment.
AUSTRALIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1979.




























All violations involved oil discharges in which enforcement was pursued, not under the federal
Australian Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act, but under complimentary state legislation.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:459(1984)
tic legislation, the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971.02
Seventy five percent of the complaints reported by the United King-
dom between 1975 and 1980 were against countries that had open regis-
try fleets. 103
In 1975, the United Kingdom had 10.73% of the world tanker regis-
try. The number of reported violations by British vessels between 1975
and 1980 was roughly 10.29% of the total violations reported around the
world. The United Kingdom appeared to be much stricter than were
other countries with respect to OILPOL 54 violations by British ships,
Fines (in Australian $)
















The average fine imposed by Australia in 1979 was equal to $1370 U.S. dollars. The total fines paid
by violators amounted to $12,331 U.S. dollars.
AUSTRALIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.








Oil and fuel spills during operation 11
Ballast and bilge discharge 6
Unknown I
TOTAL 18
Australian complaints in order by county:
1976 1977
Australia 12 Australia 8 Aus
*England 6 *England 6 W.
*Liberia 3 *Greece 4 *EngI
India 3 *Liberia 4 *Libe
*Greece 2 Singapore 4 Nor
*Panama 2 *Panama 3 Pan"
India 1
*Flag of Convenience Country















































reporting 129 violations. Only sixty-five violations involving United
Kingdom vessels were reported by foreign countries.
The average fine imposed by the United Kingdom has decreased
from an estimated $3,293 in United States dollars to $1,970 for 1979.
Total fines imposed have also followed a downward trend, dropping from
$181,111 in 1975 to $102,479 in 1974. Complaints by the United King-
dom both against its own fleet and foreign ships during this time span
have shown no trend."°
Chile
Chile reported only those violations occurring during 1981. Sixty-
three percent of the foreign vessels reported by Chile for violation be-
104 BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1975.
Source: MEPC VI/INF. 5 (Oct. 1, 1976).
The U.K. government reported that it had inspected 1,731 vessels under sections 18 and 21 of
the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971. As a result of these inspections, 55 prosecutions were
initiated, resulting in 53 convictions. Of the 53 convictions, 27 involved U.K. flag vessels, and 26
involved foreign flag vessels.
Total fines imposed were £81,380. Moreover, five awards totaling £61,505 were paid by defend-
ants toward the cost of cleaning up the pollution. The total fines were equivalent to U.S. $181,111
and cleanup fines equalled U.S. $3,349.
BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.
Source MEPC Circ. 58 Annex I (Jan. 10, 1978).
The United Kingdom reported the following action taken under its Prevention of Oil Pollution
Act, 1971:
Flag of vessel No. of violations Dismissed Fines Average fine (£)
U.K. 18 4 14 2,418
Greece 5 - 5 646
Liberia 3 1 2 2,025
Panama 3 - 1 1,708
Cyprus 1 - 1 500
Brazil 1 - 1 250
TOTAL 31 5 26 1,808
The highest fine imposed by the United Kingdom was against the U.K. vessel NATICINA, of £
20,750 or U.S. $37,371.
The average fine in 1976 was equal to U.S. $3,256.
BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.
Source: MEPC VIII/INF. 15 (Dec. 5, 1977).
Forty-nine harbor violations were reported, of which 43 resulted in convictions. Fourteen were
U.K. flag vessels, and the remaining 28 flew foreign flags. No information was provided regarding
the identity of these foreign vessels or the penalties imposed.
BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1977.
Source: MEPC X/13/3 Annex 1 (Oct. 27, 1978).
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Fines (£)
Flag of Vessel No. of Violations Range Mean Total
U.K. 17 50-5,000 923 14,775
Greece 7 100-2,500* 693 4,850
Liberia 6 200-5,000 1,500 9,000
India 2 250-3,000 1,625 3,250
Cyprus 1 100 100 100
Panama 1 100 100 100
TOTAL 34 102-4079 970 32,075
* An original fine of £15,000 levied against the Greek flag vessel SILVER OCEAN was reduced on
appeal to £2,500, or U.S. $4,526.
Fines for the above six countries totaled U.S. $58,072, with the average being about U.S. $1,756.
BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1977.
Source: MEPC X/INF. 7 (Oct. 24, 1978).
The U.K. Department of Trade conducted 1,870 inspections of vessels during this period pursu-
ant to sections 18 and 21 of the U.K. Prevention of Pollution Act of 1971. Fifty-eight oil discharge
violations were discovered as a result of these investigations, of which 56 resulted in conviction.
Nineteen of these 56 involved U.K. flag vessels; the remaining 37 were of foreign registry. After
appeals, fines totaled £63,577, or £1,135 per conviction. An additional £7,880 was assessed for pollu-
tion clean up costs. These figures converted to U.S. dollars are: $115,106 total, $2,055 average fine
and $14,267 assessed for clean up.
BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1978.
Source: MEPC XII/11/2 Annex I (Sept. 27, 1979).
The following penalties were imposed by the British government under its Prevention of Oil













The fines imposed by the British government ranged from £25 to £5,000, or U.S. $49 to $9,763.
BRITISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1979.
Source: MEPC XV/11/6 Annex I (Feb. 6, 1981).
Oil Pollution
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longed to Greece and Panama, both flags of convenience countries.10 5









































Fines totaled £52,486 during this period, or an average fine of £1,009 per violation. Only one
vessel, the ENA CLYDE, was found not guilty by British courts.
Total fines for this period were equivalent to U.S. $102,479 and the average was U.S. $1,970.
BRITISH FLAG AND PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/15 Annex 1 (Oct. 21, 1981).
The following penalties were imposed by the United Kingdom against U.K. vessels anywhere


































In one instance, the Master of the Danish vessel BRISTOL was conditionally discharged for
two years.
105 CHILEAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1981.
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fines in 1981 were equivalent to $815,248 (United States dollars), almost
three times that of any other country in any given year. The average fine
exceeded $30,000.
France
France reported its port state enforcement actions for only one year,
1978. France had 4.62% of the world's tankers in 1975, making it the
sixth largest country in world tanker registry. In contrast to many of the
other countries that reported violations, France fined only one of its own
vessels. 106
East Germany
The German Democratic Republic reported its port state enforce-
ment for the twelve month period ending April 1980. Almost all viola-




The Federal Republic of Germany reported only those violations
occurring during 1981. As was the case for East Germany, most viola-
Fines were imposed for each of these 27 violations in Gold Pesos (1 Peso Oro = U.S. $4,016).
The largest fine was 40,000 Pesos, imposed against a Greek vessel. The smallest fine was 1,000
Pesos. Total fines collected were 203,000 Pesos, or an average fine of 7,519 Pesos. Fines against
Greek vessels totaled 78,000 Pesos, or an average fine of 13,000 Pesos; fines against Panamanian
vessels totaled 46,000 Pesos, or an average of 7,666 Pesos.
106 FRENCH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1978.






Of these violations, only one resulted in the imposition of a fine, and that in the amount of
10,000 francs, or U.S. $2,230 against a French flag vessel.
107 EAST GERMAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING APR. 1979 to APR. 1980.







All of these violations involved unlawful oil discharges in the territorial waters of the German
Democratic Republic. The East German government imposed a 2,500 M (U.S. $1,382) fine against a
Greek vessel for hull leakage, and a 1,000 M (U.S. $553) fine against a Swedish vessel for spillage
during bunkering. However, most fines were imposed in the 200-300 M range (U.S. $111-$166).
Oil Pollution
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tions were committed by vessels of Greek, Panamanian, and Liberian
registry. West German port officials seemed particularly concerned with
oil record book violations. Indeed, all reported violations involved such
deficiencies, while none involved pollution. 108
Greece
The Greek government is one of a handful of states which have re-
ported their port state enforcement activities since the mid-1970s.
Greece has the most complained-of fleet in the world, with 329 violations
between 1975 and 1981. Of those complaints, 216 were self imposed by
the Greek government against Greek registered ships. Reports of viola-
tions from other countries totaled 113, placing Greece's fleet in third
place behind Liberia with 174 and Panama with 150. The high number
of violations may be due in part to the age of the Greek fleet. In 1976,
thirty-five percent of the Greek ships were older than ten years, com-
pared to sixteen percent l'or the total world fleet.
Greece has strong incentives for sanctioning pollution violations oc-
curring within its territorial waters. Indeed, its tourist and fishing indus-
tries are major contributors to the Greek economy, and both might suffer
unduly as a result of oil pollution." 9
108 WEST GERMAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1981.









All of the above offenses involved oil record book violations (no oil record book on board, or
entries insufficient or nonexistent), except two oil discharge violations, one involving Greece, the
other involving Liberia.
There was no indication as to the disposition of these violations.
Sixty-four percent of the violations reported by West Germany were against open registry
countries.
109 GREEK PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1975.
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Greece charged 196 foreign vessels with violations between 1975
The fines imposed ranged from 2,000 to 7,500,000 Drachmas, and totalled 12,423,500 Drach-
mas, or an average of approximately 165,000 Drachmas per offense.
Translated into U.S. dollars, total fines were $348,485 and the average fine was $4,628. Fines
ranged from U.S. $56 to U.S. $210,379.
Eighty-two percent of the violations reported by Greece in 1975 were against open registry
countries.
GREEK PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.
Source: MEPC VIII/12 Annex 4 (Nov. 4, 1977).
Fines (in Drachnas)
No. of
Flag of Vessel Violations Range Mean Total
Greece 33 3,000-700,000 69,667 2,299,000
Cyprus 15 3,000-500,000 48,333 725,000
Liberia 9 5,000-650,000 95,000 855,000
Panama 8 2,000-50,000 23,625 189,000
TOTAL 65 3,154-566,923 62,585 4,068,000
Total fines are equivalent to U.S. $109,857 with the average fine being U.S. $1,690. All four
countries cited above are flag of convenience countries.
GREEK PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1977.
Source: MEPC XI/14/2 Annex I (Apr. 23, 1979).













A total of 11,275,000 Drachmas, or (U.S. $317,516) was imposed as fines against these 79 viola-
tors. The fines averaged 142,721 Drachmas, or U.S. $4,019. The largest fine was 2,500,000 Drach-
mas against the ESSO PAPPAS; the smallest was 20,000 Drachmas. In U.S. dollars this range is
equivalent to $563 - $70,403.
Fifty-three percent of the foreign vessels cited with violations were from countries with open
registry fleets. This figure jumps to 77% if Greek self imposed complaints are included.
GREEK PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1978.
Source: MEPC XII/l 1/8 Annex I (Oct. 18, 1979).

















Fines imposed for these 56 violations totaled 4,690,000 Drachmas, or an average fine of 83,750
Drachmas. There were several fines levied as low as 15,000 Drachmas. The largest fines were
400,000 Drachmas in two instances, both involving Greek flag vessels. Total fines were equivalent to
U.S. $130,169, with the average fine being U.S. $2,324. The lowest and highest fines were equivalent
to U.S. $416 and U.S. $11,102.
Sixty-eight percent of the foreign vessels complained of by Greece were from open registry
countries.
GREEK PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Jan. 4 to Dec. 22, 1979.
Source: MEPC XV/1l (Apr. 6, 1981).
Fines (Greek Drachmas)
Flag of Vessel Total Imposed Range Mean
Greece 37 6,345,000 20,000-800,000 171,486
Panama 9 1,520,000 30,000-600,000 168,889
Cyprus 4 190,000 40,000-70,000 47,500
Italy 3 1,550,000 150,000-600,000 516,667
Sweden 3 280,000 30,000-180,000 9,333
Egypt 2 100,000 30,000-70,000 50,000
Libya 2 250,000 100,000-150,000 125,000
Liberia 2 435,000 35,000-400,000 217,500
U.S. 2 750,000 150,000-600,000 375,000
Other 5 300,000 30,100-150,000 60,000
TOTAL 69 11,720,000 36,000-591,449 166,203
The largest penalty imposed was 800,000 Drachmas, or U.S. $21,727 dollars, against a Greek
vessel. In fact, the most highly penalized vessels were those of Greece, Panama, Liberia, the United
States, and Italy. Total fines in 1979 were equivalent to U.S. $318,305, with an average fine of U.S.
$4,514. Forty-seven percent of the foreign vessels complained of by Greece were from open registry
countries.
GREEK PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/17 Annex 1 (Nov. 11, 1981).
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from five countries that had open registry fleets. Those countries and the
number of complaints were as follows:
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 TOTAL
Cyprus 9 15 10 7 4 2 47
Panama 7 8 2 4 9 5 35
Liberia 11 9 6 2 2 4 34
England - - 2 3 - 2 7
Singapore - 1 1 1
TOTAL 125
Except for downward fluctuations in 1976 and 1978, the average fine
imposed by Greece has been around $4,600 (United States dollars). The
total fines imposed have regularly increased, however, rising from
$130,169 in 1978 to $322,322 in 1980. In the aggregate, Greece has im-
posed the greatest amount of fines, totaling $1,546,645.110
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has reported only three violations, and failed to identify










All 58 incidents resulted in the imposition of a fine by the Greek government. The fines totaled
13,710,000 Drachmas, or U.S. $322,322. The fines averaged 236,379 Drachmas, or U.S. $5,557 per
violation.
Fifty-two percent of the foreign vessels complained of by Greece in 1980 were from countries
that had open registration. The largest fine imposed was 5,000,000 Drachmas upon the Panamanian
vessel KAREEM B. The lowest fine was 20,000 Drachmas imposed upon the Greek vessel SILVER
LIGHT.
110 See Table III, supra.
111 HONG KONG PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1977-78.
Source: XI/14/2 Annex 5 (Apr. 23, 1979).
During 1977, Hong Kong imposed fines totaling H.K. $81,000 (U.S. $31,694) against seven
vessels for unlawful oil discharges. The flag states were not identified.
During 1978, it imposed fines totaling H.K. $31,000 (U.S. $7,925) against five oil discharge
violators. Again, the flag of the vessels was not identified in the report.
HONG KONG PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT ON ONE OCCASION.
Source: MEPC XIII/13/6 Annex 2 (Apr. 8, 1980).
A single discharge by the vessel MEI-AM resulted in the imposition of a fine by Hong Kong in
the amount of H.K. $5,000, or U.S. $982.








Israel began reporting its port state enforcement activity in 1980.113
Israel followed the general trend by imposing fines more often against its
own vessels, rather than foreign-flag vessels.
Source: MEPC 17/15/2 Annex 1 (Mar. 23, 1982).
Hong Kong reported two oil discharge violations resulting in total fines of H.K. $15,000, or
U.S. $2,727.
112 IRISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1975-1976.
Source: MEPC VIII/12 Annex 2 (Nov. 4, 1977).
One prosecution in 1975 resulted in the imposition of an £300 Irish fine for an oil discharge. No
vessels were prosecuted during 1976.
IRISH PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/10 (Oct. 1, 1981).
The following vessels were prosecuted by the Irish government under its Oil Pollution of the Sea
Act.
LIR Penalty







Total fines imposed by Ireland were equivalent to U.S. $2,590 and the costs were equivalent to
U.S. $253.
113 ISRAELI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XV/11/I1 (Mar. 10, 1981).
Type of Violation Fine Imposed (IS) Under
Flag of Vessel Discharge Oil Record Book Total Mean Investigation
Israel - 6 2,000 2,000 5
Liberia 1 1 4,000 2,000 1
W. Germany 2 - 4,000 2,000 -
Panama 1 3,130 3,130
Turkey 1 - 2,000 2,000 -
TOTAL 5 7 13,130 2,188 6
Total fines imposed by Israel in 1980 were equivalent to U.S. $2,672, with the average fine
equivalent to U.S. $445.
ISRAELI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1981.
Source: MEPC 17/15/3 Annex I (Apr. 1, 1982).
These penalties were imposed by Israel under its prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil
Ordinance (1980) for offenses in Israeli ports.
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Japan
Japan has submitted a generous amount of data concerning its port
state enforcement activities since 1978. Indeed, during the three year
period between 1978 and 1980, Japan reported more violations, 461, than
any other country. This was 278 more complaints than the next highest
country for total number of reported violations.
Each year, Japan has reported a larger number of violations in its
waters than in the previous year. In the three years Japan has reported,
the total number of violations has progressively increased from ninety-
seven in 1979, to 176 in 1980, to 188 in 1981. Similarly, enforcement
actions taken by the Japanese against domestic vessels have increased
from eighteen in 1979 to fifty-four in 1980 and sixty-one in 1981. No
other country has more self imposed complaints for this three year
period.
Japan has cited vessels of twenty-two different countries, more than
any other country reporting. Of the 328, or sixty-three percent, of the
complaints against foreign vessels, 207 were filed by Japan against ships
from the following five open registry fleet countries.
Japanese Complaints Against Open Registry Fleets
1978 1979 1980 TOTAL
U.K. 2 6 4 12
Greece 10 13 17 40
Liberia 17 23 24 64
Panama 27 29 25 81
Singapore - 5 5 10
TOTAL 56 76 75 207
The remaining thirty-seven percent of the violation involved 16 other
countries.
Japan was third, however, in total fines imposed during this three-
year period with $142,847, behind Greece ($770,796) and Kuwait
Flag of Vessel Type of Violation
Israel 3 oil record book (2); bilge discharge (1)
Panama 1 minor oil spill
Greece I medium oil spill
TOTAL 5
Fines:
The largest fine imposed by Israel was 37,935 I.S., or U.S. $3,718, against a Panamanian vessel;
the smallest fine was 1,000 I.S., or U.S. $98, against an Israeli vessel for failure to have an oil record
book aboard.
Liberia, Panama, and Greece accounted for five out of the eight complaints against foreign ships
in Israeli waters during 1980 and 1981.
Oil Pollution
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($724,570). Japan regularly imposes penalties for unlawful pollution dis-
charges against individuals-including the vessel owner, Master, first en-
gineer, second engineer, third engineer, chief officer, oiler, and so on.
For example, for a discharge of tank cleaning water on the Japanese flag
vessel TAKAMINE MARU during February of 1980, fines of 100,000
yen each were levied against the Master, owner, and first officer. Fur-
ther, in one instance, involving the discharge of sludge from its sister
vessel the TOKUYAMA MARU, during March of 1980, the foreman of
the tank cleaning operation was sentenced to three months penal servi-
tude.114 Similarly, the discharge of heavy oil by the Japanese vessel
ASIAN REEFER on May 15, 1978, resulted in fines of 70,000 yen
against the marine engineer and an additional 70,000 yen against the
shipbuilding company. A discharge of waste oil by the Panamanian ves-
sel HEAVY TRADER led to fines of 200,000 yen each against two tank
cleaning workers.115 Nevertheless, Japan appears to be barking loudly,
but carrying a small stick, for its 70,000 yen fine is only equivalent to
United States $361 and 200,000 yen is merely the equivalent of United
States $1,031.116
114 MEPC XVI/15/ll Annex I (Oct. 2, 1981).
115 MEPC XI/INF. 20 (May, 21, 1979).
116 JAPANESE PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Jan. 20, 1978 to June 30, 1978.
Source: MEPC X/INF. 18 (Nov. 27, 1978).
Fines (Yen)
Flag of Vessel No. of Violations Range Mean Total
Panama 12 20,000-150,000 62,500 750,000
Liberia 8 30,000-150,000 57,500 460,000
Greece 4 40,000-200,000 85,000 340,000
India 2 200,000 200,000 400,000
Japan 1 - 50,000 50,000
TOTAL 27 40,370-157,407 74,074 2,000,000
75,103
for 97
Fines for the six month period listed above were equivalent to U.S. $10,309 with the average
fine being U.S. $382.
Total fines for 1978 imposed by Japan were 7,285,000 Yen, or U.S. $37,552 with the average
fine being 75,103 Yen, or U.S. $387.
JAPANESE PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING July 1978 to Dec. 1978.
Source: MEPC XIINF. 20 (May 21, 1979).
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Kuwait
Kuwait is another state which has regularly reported its port state
enforcement activities since the mid-1970s. Kuwait imposed the highest
average fines of all countries in each of the four years it reported, except
for 1981, when it was second highest behind Chile. Kuwait also imposed
the highest total fines of any reporting country in 1978 and 1979, and the
second highest in 1980 and 1981. Sixty-three percent of the foreign ves-









The fines assessed against those 70 violators by the Japanese government totaled 5,285,000 Yen,
or U.S. $27,242, and the average fine was 75,500 Yen, or U.S. $389, per violation.
JAPANESE PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1979.























no oil record book
TOTAL
Fines
Fines imposed by the Japanese government totaled 15,905,000 Yen, or U.S. $73,295, and ranged
from 20,000 Yen, or U.S. 92, to 4,000,000 Yen, or U.S. $1,843. The average fine imposed was 87,390
Yen, or U.S. $403. Ship's officers as well as vessel owners were fined. Of the 182 fines assessed for
violations within Japanese territorial waters, 29 were apportioned between owners and ship's officers.
JAPANESE PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/11 Annex 1 (Oct. 2, 1981).

























































Japanese vessels were fined a total of 5,270,000 Yen, or an average fine of 114,565 Yen per
vessel. Fines imposed upon Liberian vessels totaled 2,040,000 Yen, or an average of 85,000 Yen per
violation.
Total fines imposed by Japan during 1980 against its own ships were equivalent to U.S. $23,399.
Total fines against Liberian ships were equivalent to U.S. $9,058.
117 KUWAITI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.

















All of these violations involved an unlawful oil discharge. No oil record book violations were
reported.
Sixty-one percent of the foreign vessels cited by Kuwait as violators were from countries with
open registry fleets.
KUWAITI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1978.
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Norway








Fines were imposed by Kuwait in all but one instance. The total fines imposed were 50,000
Kuwaiti Dinars, or an average fine of 2,083 Kuwaiti Dinars per violation.
Total fines are equivalent to U.S. $184,000 and the average fine is equivalent to U.S. $7,665.
KUWAITI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1979-1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/9 (Aug. 25, 1981).
Flag of Vessel Type of Violation














All but eleven of these vessels were fined 1,500 Kuwaiti Dinars or U.S. $5,445. One was fined
100 Dinars or U.S. $363; two were fined 2,000 Dinars or U.S. $7,260; two were fined 3,000 Dinars or
U.S. $10,890; two were fined 4,000 Dinars or U.S. $14,520. The maximum fine was 5,000 Dinars or
U.S. $18,150 during this two year period, imposed against three vessels.
One case had been dismissed by the court (British vessel LAVISTER). Two cases had not yet
been finalized (Dutch vessel ZARIA, and Liberian vessel MAJESTIC PRIDE). Kuwait reported
that nine had been prosecuted, without indicating what fine, if any, had been imposed.
KUWAITI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.





Flag of Vessel No. of Violations Total Fines Average Fine
Liberia 15 30,600 2,186
Greece 5 - -
U.K. 5 3,000 1,500
Kuwait 4 - -
Singapore 4 - -
Bermuda (U.K.) 3 - -
Norway 3 - -
Italy 2 - -
India 2 - -
Panama 2 - -
Other 12 -
TOTAL 57 48,600 2,267
Fines
The largest fine imposed was 5,000 Kuwaiti Dinars, or U.S. $18,231, imposed against one Swed-
ish and two Liberian vessels. The smallest fine was 100 Dinars, or U.S. $365, against a Liberian
vessel. Most fines were 1,500 Kuwaiti Dinars, or U.S. $5,469.
Fifty-eight percent of the foreign vessels reported by Kuwait were from countries with open
registries.
KUWAITI PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1982.









Each involved unlawful oil discharges, and each violation resulted in a fine of 1,500 Kuwaiti
Dinars or U.S. $5,393.
118 NORWEGIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1979.
Source: MEPC XV/11/13 Annex I (Mar. 20, 1981).
Flag of Vessel Disposition
both guilty; each fined 500 N.Kr. or U.S.
Norway 2 $98
U.K. I guilty; fined 2,000 N.Kr. or U.S. $392
TOTAL 3
NORWEGIAN PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/14 Annex I (Oct. 14, 1981).
For offenses occurring by vessels in Norwegian waters, Norway reports the following
dispositions:
Flag of Vessel Disposition
Norway 3 not guilty 3
Greece 2 500 N.Kroner fine 1
W. Germany 1 5000 N.Kroner fine 2
TOTAL 6 6
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:459(1984)
In 1978, Norway had 8.94% of the world's tanker fleet. Between
1975 and 1981, however, its ships were cited with only 2.35% of the
violations worldwide. This favorable showing may be due in part to the
overall youth of their fleet. In 1976, ninety-four percent of Norway's
fleet was less than ten years old, compared to the world average of
eighty-four percent.
United States
The reports submitted by the United States are the most surprising.
From 1975 to 1981, it reported only a single violation, and that involving
an oil record book deficiency." 9 One would have expected accentuated
port state enforcement by the United States under its recently promul-
gated, comprehensive domestic legislation, the Port and Tanker Safety
Act of 1978.120
2. Coastal State Referrals to Flag States
This section of the article analyzes the data submitted to IMO by
coastal states regarding violations which they reported to flag states and
the flag state response.
Coastal and port states frequently refer OILPOL 54 violations
which they detect to the state of registry of the offending vessel. For
violations which occur within their territorial waters or ports, they fre-
quently impose penalties directly, as was explained in the previous sec-
tion of this article. Ordinarily, coastal states have the opportunity to
exercise such "self-help" enforcement only where the vessel docks in
their ports (and hence, in rem jurisdiction can be asserted), or where the
vessel flies the flag of the coastal state. When the foreign flag vessel
comes to port in the coastal state, the state has discretion to refer the
violation on to the flag state. And, in all cases where the coastal state
cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction over the offending foreign-flag vessel
(usually because it is steaming onward toward a port in a third country),
its only course of action is to refer the violation to the state of registry,
Each of the three fines imposed were levied against the captain of the involved vessel.
In 1980 a 500 Kroner fine was equivalent to U.S. $101, and the 5,000 Kroner fine was
equivalent to U.S. $1,010.
119 UNITED STATES PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Jan. to Aug. 1979.
Source: MEPC XIII/13/8 (Apr. 24, 1980).
The U.S. reported that one Canadian vessel was apprehended during this period in U.S. territo-
rial waters. It was fined between U.S. $500-$1,000 for failing to have an oil record book aboard.
This was the only complaint against a Canadian vessel over the six year period.
120 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982); 46 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 3301-3306, 8304 (1982). For an analysis of this
legislation, see Dempsey & Helling, supra note 60, at 77-84.
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and hope that the flag state fulfills its obligation under OILPOL 54. Ar-
ticle VI(2) of OILPOL 54 requires the state to impose a penalty "ade-
quate in severity to discourage any such unlawful discharges. . ." and
not less than those penalties imposed for domestic transgressions of the
same nature. Under Article X(2) of OILPOL 54 the flag state must also
promptly notify the reporting coastal state of the sanctions it imposes.
TABLE VIII 121
Coastal State Enforcement Referrals to
Flag States (i.e., Complaints Reported)




































80 5 10 487
Ten coastal states reported to IMO that they had reported foreign
vessel violations to the states of registry. France and Great Britain re-
ported the largest number of violations followed by West Germany, the
Netherlands, and Japan. Reporting relatively few violations were Aus-
tralia, Greece, Israel, Norway, and the United States.
The fleets of Greece and Panama received the largest number of vio-
lations referred by coastal states, followed by Liberia, Norway, West
Germany, and Italy.
121 An attempt has been made in these tables to sort out and eliminate overlapping data in order
to provide a year by year account of coastal state enforcement. Still, some overlapping exists in the
data, as explained in the following footnotes:
a) Data includes July 1976-Aug. 1978.
b) Data includes Nov. 1977-Mar. 1978.
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Coastal Referrals:


























































The following table compares the number of complaints referred by
coastal states to flag states, with the size and age of the flag states' fleets:
TABLE X






















































































Panama and Greece, each with more than one-third of their fleets ten
years old or older, received more than three complaints per ship. In con-
trast, Japan received only one complaint for every twenty-nine ships car-
rying oil in its fleet.
The total number of violations reported by referring countries for a
flag state often does not equal the number of violations reported by the
flag state itself. For example, Panama reported the action it took on 170




fifty-six violations by that country. One can only speculate as to why this
disparity exists. Perhaps more states refer violations to flag states than
report referrals to IMO. Also, Panama, as did every nation, took action
with respect to vessels flying flags of nations which rarely or never report
to IMO.
Let us now examine several of the nations which provided specific
data to IMO regarding their coastal and port state referrals to flag states.
Australia
Australia reported to IMO only four violations which it had referred
to flag states. All involved oil record book violations.' 22
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has regularly reported its referrals to flag
states since 1976. In a large number of instances,' 23 no reply at all has
been received from the flag state as to the disposition of the alleged
violation.
Greek flag vessels were responsible for almost half the violations re-
ported by the United Kingdom for 1980. The disposition of these refer-






Of the five fines imposed by the Greek government, one was reported in
United States dollars ($1,750). The remaining four were reported in
Greek drachmas, totalling 680,000 ($15,980), or an average of 170,000
Drachmas ($3,995) per violation. The largest fine imposed was 400,000
Drachmas ($9,400) upon the Greek vessel SERIFOS, which had been
observed discharging oil. 24
Of the forty-five violations referred to flag states by the United
122 AUSTRALIAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1978.
Source: MEPC XII/I 1/4 (Oct. 15, 1979).





123 Nine of 16 violations for the two year period ending August 16, 1978, and 18 of the 45 viola-
tions reported for 1978.
124 MEPC XVI/15/5 Annex 3 (Oct. 21, 1981).
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Kingdom during 1978, only one resulted in a fine. The Norwegian vessel
BOHEMUND was observed by RAF aircraft on November 9, 1978, dis-
charging what appeared to be petrochemical liquid from its stem. Full
investigation by Norwegian authorities led to the imposition of a 1500
kroner ($282) fine. Liberian authorities imposed unspecified penalties on
the owners of the ORIENTAL CONFIDENCE as a result of a report
that an RAF helicopter had observed the vessel on January 1, 1977, dis-
charging oil into the sea, creating a slick 800 yards long and 300 yards
wide. 125
As was typical with reporting by all states, the British reports
tended to vary in terms of the detail of data provided. Moreover, British
reports sometimes overlapped one another in terms of the time frames
reported. 126
125 MEPC XII/1/2 Annex 3 (Oct. 27, 1979).
126 BRITISH REFERRALS TO FOREIGN FLAG STATES DURING Jan. 1, 1976 to June 30,
1977.
Source: MEPC/Circ. 58 Annex 3 (Jan. 10, 1978).
Of the 19 violations referred to flag states by the United Kingdom during this period, six re-
sulted in penalties, three were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and for the remainder, no response
had been received.
The largest fines were imposed by Greece of 75,000 Drachmas (U.S. $1,948) (£250), 30,000
Drachmas (U.S. $779) (£500), and U.S. $1,200. In two instances, Liberia imposed its standard fine
of U.S. $500. Panama's fine was only £175 (U.S. $315) for a 13 mile long oil slick.
BRITISH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING July 1, 1976 to Aug. 16, 1978.
Source: MEPC X/13/3 Annex 3 (Oct. 27, 1978).
Disposition
Dismissed
Number of or Under No
Flag of Vessel Violations Not Guilty Penalty Investigation Reply
India 3 1 2
Norway 3 1 11
Brazil 2 2
France 2 1 1
Greece 2 1 1
Italy 2 2
Liberia 1 I
W. Germany 1 1
TOTAL 16 2 4 9
All violations involved unlawful discharges; none involved oil record book violations.
Of the two instances in which fines were imposed, Greece levied a 70,000 Drachmas (U.S.
$1,811) fine on a vessel responsible for a five mile slick off Cornwall. Liberia imposed a fine of U.S.
$500 for a bunker oil spill in Glasgow.
BRITISH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1978.
Source: MEPC XII/l 1/2 Annex 3 (Sept. 27, 1979).





The Dutch referred a very small percentage of discovered violations
to the flag states. For the period from January 1977, to July 1978, it
referred only 4.4% of the violations it discovered. However, the Nether-
lands government made considerable efforts to provide sufficient evidence
for those violations which it did refer, and during the above period it
detailed the pollution allegations with photographs of the oil discharges.
For the most part, the Dutch referred nothing less severe than pollution
























BRITISH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/5 Annex 3 (Oct. 21, 1981).



























No reply had been received from India regarding its two violations.
BRITISH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING July 1, 1976 to Jan. 19, 1981.
Source: MEPC XV/I1/6 Annex 3 (Feb. 6, 1981).
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the flag state. 127
France
































2 14 9 5
The Greek flag vessel SERIFER was observed discharging oil twice during a three month pe-
riod in 1979.
The United Kingdom had waited up to three and one-half years to receive a response to a report
filed with India.
127 DUTCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Jan. 1977 to July 1978.





















The Netherlands discovered 159 violations during this period, but referred only the aforemen-
tioned seven (4.4%) to flag states.
All violations involved unlawful discharges. None involved record book violations. Brazil had
not ratified OILPOL as of this date.
Only one penalty was imposed, and that by Panama in the amount of U.S. $300 as a result of a
10 mile discharge trail behind a Panamanian vessel. All referrals by the Netherlands' government
included photographs of the oil discharge, including that of an oil slick of 25 nautical miles following
the Liberian tanker ENO SAINT JOHN on October 25, 1977.
DUTCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING July 1978 to Jan. 1980.
Source: MEPC XIII/13/7 Annex I (Apr. 18, 1980).
Although the Netherlands discovered 148 violations during this period, only 37 were deemed to
have sufficient evidence to warrant referral to flag states. All 37 involved oil discharge violations.
Oil Pollution
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likely to reply to its referrals. As of September 15, 1975, there was no




















STATES MOST OFTEN FAILING TO REPLY
Greece (3) Liberia (2)
Liberia (3) Denmark (2) Panama (1)
Liberia (3) Denmark (2) Greece (2)
Denmark (1) Greece (1)
Greece (1)
Greece (4) Liberia (1) Panama (1)
Greece (1) Liberia (1)
France also provided examples of instances in which the alleged violators
were found not guilty or in which the case was dismissed. For example,
the West German vessel STADT EMDEN was photographed by French
military aircraft which an oil trail six nautical miles long and 100 metres
wide. The German courts dismissed the case for lack of sufficient evi-
dence. Similarly, the Liberian vessel KERO was photographed by
French military jets in August 1974 with an oil trail 300 metres long.
Disposition
Total
Number of Not Insufficient Under No
Flag of Vessel Violations Guilty Penalty Evidence Investigation Reply
Liberia 9 1 1 4 3
Panama 6 2 4
Greece 5 5
W. Germany 3 3
Norway 2 1 1
Indonesia 2 1 1
Cyprus I I
U.K. I 1
Other 8 1 2 5
All discharge 37 1 T 14 "-
The only fine imposed was in the amount of U.S. $500, imposed by Liberia.
DUTCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Jan. 1980 to Jan. 1981.
Source: MEPC XV/1I/9 Annex 1 (Mar. 5, 1981).
Type of Violation Disposition
Oil Dismissed or Under
Flag of Vessel Discharge Record Book Not Guilty Investigation
Greece 3 1
Norway 3 3
Liberia 2 1 3
Other 7 1 1





Netherlands' referrals to states not signatures of OILPOL 54 (Le., Brazil, China and Zaire)
elicited no response from these flag states. Neither did referrals to Czechoslovakia or Nigeria.
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The discharge hose was visible on the photographs. The Liberian gov-
ernment claimed that the ship had since passed to another flag state, and
that the Liberian government therefore had no means of compelling the
shipowner to cooperate in the inquiry. Hence, the case was dropped.
128
France apparently utilizes its military aircraft as a means of collect-
ing evidence of pollution violations. Of the forty-four referred violations
occurring during 1978, french aircraft took photographs of twenty-nine
of the discharges. 129 In not a single such case were fines imposed by the
flag state.
130
128 MEPC Circ. 30 (Feb. 25, 1976).
129 In five of these the vessels continued to discharge even when the French military aircraft flew
overhead. MEPC XIII/13/1 (Mar. 12, 1980).
130 FRENCH COASTAL STATE REFERRALS AND FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT
DURING 1968-1975.
Source: MEPC Circ. 30 (Feb. 25, 1976).
All of the following involve oil discharges in French territorial waters and discharges by French
vessels in foreign waters:
Flag of Vessel Responses
Liberia 42 No action taken or
Greece 28 charges dropped 60
Norway 21 No reply 49
France 17 Investigation or court
U.K. 11 proceedings in progress 21
Denmark 9 Fine 17
West Germany 9 Case dropped for
Italy 8 insufficient evidence 16
Cyprus 6 License suspended 1
Panama 6 Other I






France provided several examples of penalties which had been imposed.
For example, Norway fined (a) the Master of the Norwegian vessel SIBELIA the "nominal sum
of" 600 Norwegian Krons (U.S. $117) for a discharge occurring in November 1968, (b) the Master
of the HOEGH BINA 300 Norwegian Crowns for a January 1969 discharge, and (c) the Chief
Engineer of the POLYKART 300 Norwegian Krons (U.S. $59) for a similar discharge.
Liberia fined the Master of the PACIFIC GLORY U.S. $500 for a July 1969 discharge.
Greece suspended the Master of the THEORIS for three months for an October 1970 discharge.
FRENCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Jan. 1978 to July 1978.










The Federal Republic of Germany regularly refers oil record book
violations to flag states. The port officials at Hamburg are particularly
The Italian flag vessel MARINELLA D'AMICO was responsible for an oil slick 20 nautical
miles long.
FRENCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1978.
















Dismissed or Penalty Insufficient Under No
Not Guilty Imposed Evidence Investigation Reply
All referrals involved pollution discharges. None involved oil record book violations. Fines
were not imposed in a single case.
FRENCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1979.








Each of these violations were reported as being "under investigation" by the flag state at the
time this report was filed. No penalties had been imposed. French military aircraft photographed 19
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sensitive to such deficiencies.
13 1
FRENCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1979.















No oil record book
Incomplete oil record book
TOTAL
FRENCH REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1980.













The report failed to indicate what measures, if any, had been taken by the flag states with
respect to these referrals by the French government.
131 WEST GERMAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Nov. 8, 1977, to Mar. 14,
1978.










Oil Discharge Oil Record Book
The report provided no indication of what disposition, if any, the flag states had reported back
to West Germany with respect to these violations.
WEST GERMAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING May 1979 to Jan. 1980.
Source: MEPC XIII/13/3 (Mar. 18, 1980).
During this period, the Federal Republic of Germany referred four OILPOL 54 violations to
flag states, two involving Panamanian vessels. All four violations involved oil record book deficien-
cies; no disposition had been reported by the flag states.





Greece regularly refers oil pollution and oil record book violations
to flag states. Liberian vessels have been responsible for a disproportion-
ate number of such offenses.
132
Israel
Like West Germany, Israel seems particularly sensitive to oil record









Deficient oil record book entries 9
No oil record book 6
Discharge violation 3
TOTAL 18
WEST GERMAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES during Aug. 4, 1980 to Nov. 1, 1980.














oil record book 15
No oil record book 5
Oil discharge 1
TOTAL 21
All incidents occurred at Hamburg. The report failed to indicate what action, if any, had been
taken by the flag state.
WEST GERMAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING June 24, 1980 to Jan. 12, 1981.












Discharge Oil Record Book
3 2
2 2
The report failed to indicate what disposition, if any, had been reported back to the Federal
Republic of Germany as a result of these referrals.
132 GREEK REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1974-1977.
Source: MEPC XI/14/2 Annex 3 (Apr. 23, 1979).
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book violations, which constituted all of its referrals involving 1980 and
Greece reported that it referred the following violations to stages of registry:
Flag of Vessel
Liberia 2 (involving oil discharges in 1974 and 1977)
France I (involving oil record book violation in 1976)
Portugal I (involving oil record book violation in 1976)
TOTAL 4
Disposition
No action had been taken with respect to any of the four above violations as of October 17,
1978.
GREEK REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1974-78.
Source: MEPC XII/l 1/8 Annex 3 (Oct. 18, 1979).
Flag of Vessel Type of Violation
Liberia 2 Oil discharge 2
France 1 Oil record book violation 2






GREEK REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1975.
Source: MEPC/Circ. 47 Annex 3 (May 4, 1977).
In five of the six violations referred by Greece to flag states, no action had been taken, and in the
remaining instance, a full investigation had been consummated and the case had been dismissed.
GREEK REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1976.






No action had been taken on any of these Greek referrals to flag states as of the date the report
was filed. ISRAELI REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1980.









All violations involved oil record book inadequacies; none involved oil discharges. The report
failed to indicate what action, if any, had been taken by the flag states in response to these referrals.
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1981 violations, and half of those of 1982.133
Japan
Virtually all of the violations referred by Japan to flag states in-
volved oil discharges.
13 4
In 1978, Japan vigorously complained of the failure of flag state gov-
ernments to respond to its referrals. Of 883 violations it had discovered
in 1977 involving oil pollution, 269 (thirty-three percent) involved pollu-
tion by foreign flag vessels. Of these, Japan deemed 107 (forty percent)
worthy of prosecution, and referred these to the relevant flag states
which had ratified OILPOL 54. Japan provided information regarding
the location of the discharges, reports by witnesses (usually officials of
133 ISRAELI REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1980.





All five violations involved failure to have an oil record book on board. The report failed to
indicate what action, if any, had been taken.
ISRAELI REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1982.
Source: MEPC XVII/15/3 Annex 3 (Apr. 1, 1983).
Flag of Vessel Disposition
Panama 3 Not Guilty 5
W. Germany 2 No Reply 3
Greece 2 Fine 2
Other 3 TOTAL 10
TOTAL 10
Fines
Two fines for oil discharge violations were imposed as a result of these referrals by the Israeli
government. Greece imposed a fine of 30,000 Drachmas (U.S. $540); Panama imposed a fine of
1,000 Balboas (U.S. $1,000).
134 JAPANESE REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Feb. 8, 1978 to October 24, 1979.
Source: MEPC XV/l 1/I Annex (Jan. 6, 1981).
All of the following involved discharge violations observed by aircraft of the Japanese Maritime
Safety Agency, and referred to flag states:
Number of Insufficient No
Flag of Vessel Violations Evidence Prosecution Fine Reply
Panama 9 9
Liberia 8 1 7
Korea 3 3
Other 4 1 1 2
TOTAL 24 1 1 1 21
JAPANESE REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/l1 Annex 2 (Oct. 2, 1981).
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the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency), and photographs documenting
the violations. Flag state governments responded in only eighteen of
these 107 referrals (seventeen percent). As of 1977, only six instances
resulted in the employment of penal procedures (six percent of the total
referrals).135 In contrast, Japan had completed investigations in seven of
the nine violations referred to it as a flag state, and had notified the refer-
ring government of that fact.
13 6
Japan's exasperation with the inertia of flag states is reflected in its
report involving violations occurring between February 8, 1978, and Oc-
tober 24, 1979. During this period, twenty-four violations were referred
to flag states by the Japanese government. No reply was received with
respect to twenty-one of the violations. In only one case was a fine im-
posed. That involved a fine of $500 imposed by Liberia in which a vessel
flying its flag was responsible for an oil slick thirty-three miles long.
1 37
Norway
The Norwegian government has had little success in securing en-
forcement by foreign flag states against their vessels. Examples of these
violations referred by Norway to the flag state include the following:
Flag of Vessel Disposition
Liberia 8 No reply 17
Panama 7 Fine 5
Korea 4 "Full investigation
U.S.S.R. 4 led to proper procedure" 4
Greece 3 "Referred to prosecutor's
Philippines 3 office" 3
Other 5 Insufficient evidence 2
TOTAL 34 Not guilty 2
Under investigation I
TOTAL 34
Thirty-three of these 34 violations involved an oil discharge.
JAPANESE REFERRALS TO KOREA IN THREE INSTANCES DURING 1981.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/7 (Aug. 10, 1981).
Japan reported in MEPC XVI/15/7 (Aug. 10, 1981) that with respect to complaints filed by it
against three Korean-flag vessels in MEPC XII/11/1, (Sept. 27, 1979) Korea had taken the follow-
ing actions:
Vessel Action taken by Korea
CHANG WON Insufficient evidence; released
YU YANG Prosecution terminated; fish dumped, not oil
MARK RYUN Proceedings instituted for violation of Law
Concerning the Prevention of Sea Pollution
135 MEPC X/INF. 18 (Nov. 27, 1978).
136 Id.
137 MEPC SV/1l/1 Annex 3 (Jan. 6, 1981).
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An analysis of oil samples from dead sea birds demonstrated that
the Greek vessel STYLIS discharged oily water during its tank cleaning
operations on December 31, 1980, in international waters between the
Netherlands and Norway. Norway alleged that, in all probability, this
discharge caused the death of approximately 30,000 sea birds. A final
reply from the Greek government had still not been received as of Octo-
ber 1981.
Similarly, Norway reported to Sweden the discharge of an unspeci-
fied quantity of oil in a Norwegian port by the Swedish vessel STENA
SAGA. An investigation by Swedish authorities led them to conclude
that the discharge was not punishable under Swedish law. 138 In no in-
stance was Norway appraised that any effective enforcement action had
been taken by the flag state.
139
United States
The United States provided little information regarding the disposi-
tion of violations referred to flag states by it."~
138 MEPC XVI/15/14 Annex III (Oct. 14, 1981).
139 NORWEGIAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Apr. 27, 1979 to Oct. 23,
1979.
Source: MEPC XV/l1/13 Annex 3 (Mar. 20, 1981).
Flag of Vessel Number of Violations Disposition
Denmark 1 Dismissed
Greece I Under investigation
Liberia 1 No reply
U.S.S.R. 1 Dismissed
W. Germany 1 Dismissed
TOTAL 5
NORWEGIAN REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVII5/14 Annex III (Oct. 14, 1981).
For offenses committed by foreign flag vessels referred to the state of registration, Norway
reported the following dispositions:
Flag of Vessel Disposition
Greece 3 Under investigation 2
Sweden 1 Insufficient evidence I
Italy 1 Not guilty 1
TOTAL 5 Final reply still awaited 1
TOTAL 5
NORWEGIAN REFERRAL TO GREECE IN ONE INSTANCE DURING 1981.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/2 (June 8, 1981).
Norway reported the existence of a large number of dead sea birds along the southeast coast of
Norway and the west coast of Sweden. Their death was attributed to an oil spill. An analysis of oil
samples revealed that the Greek vessel STYLIS had discharged oil in violation of OILPOL 54. The
violation was reported to Greece.
140 UNITED STATES REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Jan. 1979 to Aug. 1979.
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3. Flag State Enforcement
The maritime pollution prevention conventions, such as OILPOL
54, have traditionally relied on the state of registry to provide effective
enforcement. However, flag states may be unable or unwilling to comply
with the regulations, even though they are contracting parties. It may be
very difficult for a flag of convenience state to enforce construction or
safety standards because the ships may rarely sail into its national ports.
Moreover, its navy may be too small to police its massive merchant
Source: MEPC XIII/13/8 (Apr. 24, 1980).
The United States indicated that during this period it referred two violations, both involving
Panamanian vessels. One was referred because of an oil discharge; the second was referred because
no oil record book was aboard. The United States did not indicate the disposition of these com-
plaints, if any, by Panamanian authorities.
UNITED STATES (Puerto Rico) REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES INVOLVING INCIDENTS
OCCURRING IN PUERTO RICO DURING 1979.
Source: MEPC XII/1l/3 (Oct. 15, 1979).





There was no indication in the report of what action, if any, had been taken by the flag states.
UNITED STATES REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES ON SIX OCCASIONS.
Source: MEPC XIII/13/6 Annex 1 (Apr. 6, 1980).
Six oil record book violations were referred by the U.S. government to the flag states. No
disposition was indicated. Three offenses were committed by vessels of the Dominican Republic,
and one each was committed by Greek, Panamanian and Venezuelan vessels.
UNITED STATES REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING Sept. 1979 to Feb. 1980.






The Liberian violation involved an oil discharge. All others involved oil record book violations.
The report failed to indicate what action, if any, had been taken by the flag states in response to these
complaints.
UNITED STATES REFERRALS TO FLAG STATES DURING SUMMER, 1980.
Source: MEPC XV/l 1/7 Annex 1 (Feb. 20, 1981).
Flag of Vessel Type of Violation
Greece no oil record book aboard
S. Korea oil discharge
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fleet.141 In addition, stringent regulation of ships by a flag state might
discourage flag of convenience registry in that state.142 Although regis-
tration fees are relatively inexpensive, aggregate income derived from
fees can be a significant source of revenue for flag states. For example,
registration fees comprise approximately eight percent of Liberia's gross
national product.143
The lack of compliance with the requirements of OILPOL 54 by the
contracting parties is indicative of the problems of enforcement of inter-
national pollution control regulations. These problems include failure to
promptly investigate violations, and failure to report what action, if any,
was taken with respect to reported violations, and the discretionary im-
position of fines inadequate to discourage discharges. With respect to
alleged violations reported back to the state of registry by coastal states,
only eleven states reported what enforcement action, if any, they took
with respect thereto. 44
United Kingdom
The data submitted by the United Kingdom is somewhat difficult to
analyze, because its reports overlap in time. Given that deficiency, if one
simply adds the total number of referrals reported by coastal states in the
preceding section of this article (189), and compares that figure with the
enforcement dispositions reported by Britain to IMO in these overlap-
ping reports (sixty), one learns that Britain has failed to report its ac-
The United States did not indicate what disposition of these referrals, if any, had been reported.
141 Dempsey & Helling, supra note 60, at 63.
142 Id
143 Payne, supra note 16, at 71.
144 The United Kingdom, the Peoples' Republic of China, the Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, Ja-
pan, Liberia, Norway, Panama, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Greece re-
ported over the longest period of time (1973 to 1980), and acknowledged the most reported
violations (182), as well as the greatest percentage of penalties for those violations (68%). The
following table describes the fines imposed by several of the reporting states:
Flag State Enforcement fines reported imposed (in U.S. S)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Total Average
Greece 43,176 33,500 41,130 43,357 161,163 1,677
Panama 71,820 71,820 1,026
U.K. 31,694 31,694 7,925
Liberia 6,800 500 7,300 500
Japan 226 226 226
43,176 40,300 41,130 32,194 226 43,357 71,820 272,203
Due to the inconsistent reporting by the states involved, these figures should not be taken as the
absolute fines imposed for each year, but as a guide for what has generally occurred in the realm of
flag state enforcement. The year-by-year headings are intended to provide a general time frame for
when fines were reported. The actual time period covered by the reported figures varies in some
instances to include up to one year prior and subsequent to the year listed.
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tions, if any, taken with respect to more than a hundred referred
violations. Fines were imposed by the United Kingdom in only four
instances between 1976 and 1980. The remaining violations were re-
ported as either dismissed or under investigation. Only three of these are
reported as oil record book violations; the remainder involve oil
discharges.
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145 BRITISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.














BRITISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Oct. 8, 1976 to July 12, 1978.














BRITISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1978.
Source: MEPC XIL/1 1/2 Annex 2 (Sept. 27, 1979).
The following actions were taken by the U.K. government in response to 13 violations concern-





Not Guilty - No offense
committed 2
Violation concluded to




No fines were imposed by the British government regarding any of the above offenses.
BRITISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Nov. 1977 to Aug. 1980.




The Peoples Republic of China reported only its disposition of a
single complaint. The Peoples Republic of China indicated that the re-
sults of its prosecution of the Chinese vessel NUA CHUN were reported
to the Netherlands, which initiated the complaint. 1"
The Netherlands
The Netherlands reports to IMO relatively few of the actions, if any,
taken with respect to coastal state referrals. Of the sixty alleged viola-
tions referred to the Netherlands in the preceding section of this article,
the Dutch government only reported seven; in none was a penalty
imposed. 47
Disposition
Type of No. of Not Insufficient Under
Violation Violations Guilty Fine Evidence Investigation Other
Oil
Discharge 12 4 4 3 1
Oil Record
Book Offense 2 1 1
TOTAL 14 1 4 4 3 2
Of these 14 violations, four resulted in the imposition of a fine. Fines totaled £14,950 (U.S.
$31,694), or an average of £3,738 (U.S. $7,925) per incident.
With respect to a violation reported by Japan in MEPC XV/11/1 (Jan., 1981), in which the
U.K. flag vessel CITY OF EDINBURGH was observed discharging oil by a Japanese patrol aircraft
on June 6, 1979, the British government determined that insufficient evidence existed to prosecute.
BRITISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN Jan. 31 and Sept. 30, 1981.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/15 Annex 2 (Oct. 21, 1981).
The following actions were taken by the U.K. government against U.K. flag vessels in response
to reports submitted by foreign governments:
Reporting state: Disposition:
Italy 2 Additional information requested 3




146 See MEPC XV/11/9 Annex 1.
The report failed to indicate the outcome of the dispute.
147 DUTCH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Jan. 1977 to July 1978.
Source: MEPC X/13/5 Annex 2 (Nov. 10, 1978).
Disposition
Number of Violations Not Guilty Insufficient Evidence
4 2 2
All of these alleged violations referred to the Netherlands' government involved oil discharges.
These were photographed. All were referred to Holland by France.
DUTCH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING July 1978 to Jan. 1980.
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Greece
Greece, with the most reported violations (182) from 1973 to 1980,
imposed the largest percentage of penalties on those violations (sixty-
eight percent). The remaining violations were reported as under investi-
gation. For ninety-nine of the violations, the type of violation was speci-
fied: twenty-eight constituted oil record book violations, while the
remainder involved oil discharges.
The largest fine imposed by Greece was in the amount of $20,000
against the SOULA C for an oil discharge reported by Denmark, and
photographed by Danish aircraft on August 8, 1976.148
Source: MEPC XIII/13/7 Annex 2 (Apr. 18, 1980).
The Netherlands reported only one incident reported to it during this period, which was
dismissed.
DUTCH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.




Both found not guilty after investigation.
148 GREEK FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1973-1977.
Source: MEPC XI/14/2 Annex 2 (Apr. 23, 1979).
Greece reported that it had disposed of complaints regarding violations of Greek flag vessels in
foreign waters as follows:
Type of violation Disposition
Oil discharge 22 Fine 17
No oil record book 5 Under investigation 10
TOTAL 27 TOTAL 27
For the 17 violations in which fines were imposed, the total was U.S. $46,295 or an average fine
of U.S. $2,723. The largest fine imposed was U.S. $20,000 against the SOULA C for an oil discharge
on August 8, 1976, photographed by Danish aircraft. The smallest fine was U.S. $145 for failure to
have an oil record book.
GREEK FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1975.
Source: MEPC/Circ. 47 Annex 2 (May 4, 1977).
Forty violations involving Greek flag vessels were referred to Greece during this period, 31 of
which had been fully investigated. Fines were assessed in all 31 cases. Of the 28 inches in which
fines were levied in U.S. dollars, the average fine was $1,542.
GREEK FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976.
Source: MEPC VIII/12 Annex 48 (Nov. 4, 1977).
Type of Violation Disposition
Discharge Oil Record Book Under Investigation Fines
21 3 7 17
Fines imposed by Greece against vessels flying her flag ranged from U.S. $300 to U.S. $13,000,
the latter imposed against a vessel which had discharged unlawfully in Canadian waters. Total fines





Ireland reported but a single disposition with respect to a vessel fly-
GREEK FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1976-1978
Source: MEPC XII/1l/8 Annex 2 (Oct. 18, 1979).
Greece reported the following violations involving its vessels in foreign waters:
Type of violation Disposition
Oil discharge 30 Fines 20
No oil record book Under investigation 16
on board 6 TOTAL 36
TOTAL 36
Of the 20 fines imposed, 17 were reported in U.S. dollars, and totaled $41,130, or an average
fine of $2,419. The largest was U.S. $13,500 for the discharge of oil by the Greek flag vessel VYMA
on June 16, 1978. It left a long slick in its trail which was photographed by the French air force.
The smallest fine was U.S. $130 for failing to have an oil record book on board.
GREEK FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Sept. 6, 1978 to Apr. 16, 1979.
Source: MEPC XV/1l Annex 3 (Apr. 6, 1981).
Type of violation Total violations Prosecutions
Oil discharge 24 12
No oil record book 9 2
Incomplete oil record book 4
Spillage at transfer 2 1
TOTAL 39 15
In one case, a 50 kilometer-oil slick led to the removal of the vessel from Greek registry. In
another, the absence of an oil record book led to the same result. Twenty-four cases were under
investigation at the time the report was fied.
GREEK FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/17 Annex 2 (Nov. 4, 1981).
Greece reported the following disposition of violations alleged against Greek-flag vessels in for-
eign waters:
Reporting state Disposition
U.K. 7 Fine imposed 22
France 6 Insufficient evidence 2
Belgium 4 Unspecified discipline
Canada 2 of master I
Fed. Rep. Germany 2 Vessel released I




Of the 22 fines imposed, five were reported in U.S. dollars, and averaged $1,500 each. One was
reported for U.S. $450,000 for an oil discharge by a Greek vessel in Canadian waters. A fine of U.S.
$1,000 was imposed for a discharge reported by Belgium.
The remaining 15 were reported in Drachmas, and totaled 1,079,000 Drachmas (U.S. $25,357).
The average fine was 71,933 Drachmas (U.S. $1,690). The largest fine was 400,000 Drachmas (U.S.
$9,400), imposed against the Greek vessel SERIFOS for a discharge in British waters. The smallest
was 6,000 Drachmas (U.S. $141), imposed as a result of a West German complaint alleging an
insufficient record book by the Greek vessel ATTIKA HOPE.
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ing its flag. It dismissed the complaint due to insufficient evidence.149
Japan
Japan also reported only a single disposition, in which it imposed a
$226 fine.'5 0
Liberia
Liberia reported the action it took on only twenty-nine out of a total
of 121 violations reported by coastal states. For sixty-two percent of the
reported dispositions it imposed fines, with the largest fine in the amount
of $500. The remaining violations were dismissed because of insufficient
evidence or after a finding that the ship was not guilty. Most of the viola-
tions appear to be from oil discharges. 151
149 IRISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT IN ONE INSTANCE.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/5 (Aug. 6, 1981).
In response to a U.K. complaint against the Irish vessel BELL RIVAL, Ireland concludes that
there exists insufficient evidence to prosecute under Section 1 of its Oil Pollution of the Sea Act of
1977.
150 JAPANESE FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1979.
Source: MEPC XV/l 1/1 Annex 2 (Jan. 6, 1981).
One offense was reported to Japan regarding an OILPOL 54 violation involving a vessel flying
its flag. The Canadian government sighted the Japanese vessel KEIJU MARU dumping a six mile
slick. Japan imposed at 50,000 Yen (U.S. $226) fine as a result thereof.
151 LIBERIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT ON TEN OCCASIONS DURING Mar. 26,
1976 to Nov. 13, 1977.
Source: MEPC X/13/1 Annex 1 (July 13, 1978).
This report was presumably submitted in response to Japanese complaints regarding the failure
of flag states to respond to Japanese referrals. See MEPC X/INN. 19 (Nov. 27, 1978). Liberia
responded that of 10 violations referred by Japan involving Liberian flag vessels, "in all of the re-
ported cases, a guilty determination was found based on the excellent evidence provided by the
Government of Japan. The maximum fine authorized by Liberian law has been imposed for these
first offenses."
Of these 10 discharge violations, each vessel left an oil slick at least two miles, and as long as 22
miles long. The discharges were each estimated to have exceeded the 60 litres per mile maximum
authorized by the 1969 amendments to OILPOL 54. In each case, the same fine was imposed by
Liberia-U.S. $500.
LIBERIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT IN 12 INSTANCES DURING July 12, 1976 to
Oct. 26, 1977.
Source: MEPC X/13/1 Add. 2 (Nov. 10, 1978).
Liberia responded as follows with respect to 12 pollution violations referred to it by France:
In five cases, charges were dismissed because of insufficient evidence. This seems peculiar, in
light of the fact that France often provides some of the most complete information on discharge
violations. Two cases were dismissed because of inconclusive proof. Another was dismissed follow-
ing a plea of not guilty, and another was referred to the ship's agent.
Only three of the 12 French referrals resulted in the imposition of penalties. A fine of U.S. $300
was imposed in one instance, and of U.S. $500 in the remaining two.
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Liberia's enforcement procedures are as follows. Under the Libe-
rian Maritime Regulations, the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs has
power to require inspection of ships and documents under its flag.
152
The regulations promulgated under this law provide for a team of nauti-
cal inspectors to be based around the world in the major ports frequented
by Liberian vessels'53 to conduct safety examinations. Vessel owners and
operators are obliged to present their ships for inspection when requested
and to cooperate fully with the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs,
which administers vessel regulations. 4 Failure to comply may result in
detention and suspension of the vessel's registration.'55
The regulations also provide procedures for investigating marine
casualties and offenses. Marine casualties are defined as "any act or of-
fense contrary to the Maritime Law or any Regulations thereunder,"' 56
including, but not limited to, intentional oil pollution.'5 7 Under these
provisions, the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs:
upon receipt of information of a marine casualty or offense, may institute
such investigation as may be necessary to determine as closely as possible
LIBERIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT IN TWO INSTANCES, SEPT. I1, 1977 and May
20, 1978.
Source: MEPC XI/INN. 26 (June 4, 1979).
Japan referred two Liberian flag violations to Liberia: (1) the MURRAYEVERETT dis-
charged oil off the coast of Turkima Island, Japan, on September 11, 1977, leaving a slick one kilo-
meter long and 50 metres wide; (2) the MOORGATE KING discharged oil off the coast of
Kagoshima, Japan, on May 20, 1978, leaving a slick 33 nautical miles long and 20-100 meters wide.
In both instances, the Liberian government fined the owners U.S. $500.
LIBERIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1981, IN RESPONSE TO FIVE
FRENCH REFERRALS.
Source: MEPC XV/ll/8 (Mar. 5, 1981).
Liberia reported these dispositions of the following referrals by the French government:
Vessel Type of Violation Disposition
OCEAN HARMONY I oil slike 10 nautical defense accepted;
miles long dismissed
PLAYUR oil slick 6 nautical defense accepted;
miles long dismissed
LAKE AMIARA oil slick 9.5 nautical charge sustained; owner
miles long and 400 fined (unspecified
metres wide amount)
CARON P.E. no oil record book vessel stricken from
aboard registry
152 22 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS OF 1956, chap. I, § II (Supp. 1981), Sales No. RLM-107 from
the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (Available from Liberian Services, Reston International Center,
Reston, VA 22091).
153 Liberian Mar. Reg. 7.191(1) (Supp. 1981).
154 Liberian Mar. Rag. 7.191(2) (Supp. 1981).
155 Id.
156 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.256(2) (Supp. 1981).
157 Liberian Mar. Reg. 2.83(1), (2) (Supp. 1981).
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the cause or any contributing causes of the casualty or circumstances of the
offense, and whether there has been any act of misconduct, inattention to
duty, or negligence upon the part of any licensed or certified person, or
violation of law or regulation, so that appropriate action may be taken.
58
This regulation is in partial conformance with Article X(2) of the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
1954,159 as amended in 1969.1" Liberia has discretion under the regula-
tions to initiate an investigation; but under the Convention it has no
choice in the matter: an investigation must be conducted. Further,
under the Convention, the flag state is required to report the results of
any investigation to the country filing a pollution complaint. This obliga-
tion is not part of the Liberian regulations.
Preliminary investigations are conducted to determine if further
proceedings are necessary in light of the evidence available. 61 If neces-
sary, formal investigations are made by a tribunal with powers to sub-
poena evidence and witnesses for evidentiary hearings. 162 Public notice
of these hearings is to be made to "interested States," '163 presumably
those that filed the pollution complaint. The conclusions of the investi-
gations are submitted to the commissioner, who may either adopt the
report's recommendations or request further investigation. 1" When the
report recommends suspension, revocation, or cancellation of a vessel's
Liberian registry (likely the most severe sanction against offending par-
ties), the commissioner has power to modify all or part of the report.65
The commissioner thus may effectively ignore a recommendation to im-
pose sanctions on an offending vessel.
Liberian regulations prohibit vessels from discharging oil into the
seas in either Liberia's coastal waters or any prohibited zone, as identified
under OILPOL 54 and any amendments ratified by Liberia. 166 These
regulations do not explicitly prohibit discharges within the fifty mile
coastal zone established in OILPOL 54, however, and do not incorporate
the more stringent LOT limitations on operational discharges that were
established by the 1969 amendments.167 Under Liberian law, vessel dis-
158 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.258(1) (Supp. 1981).
159 International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, entered
into force July 26, 1958, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900 [hereinafter cited as OILPOL 54].
160 1969 Amendments to OILPOL 54. IMO Doe. A VI/Res. 175, Jan. 16, 1970.
161 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.258(4) (Supp. 1981).
162 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.258(5) (Supp. 1981).
163 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.258(5)(c) (Supp. 1981).
164 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.258(7)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1981).
165 Liberian Mar. Reg. 9.258(7)(iii) (Supp. 1981).
166 Liberian Mar. Reg. 2.83(a), (b) (Supp. 1981).
167 1969 Amendments, supra note 160, art. 3(b).
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charge standards adopted nearly thirty years ago remain the prescriptive
regime for oil pollution of the sea.
The penalties for violations of the pollution standards amount to
little more than a slap on the wrist. Discharges within Liberia's coastal
waters face penalties of between $500 and $2500.161 When Liberian
tankers discharge sludge oil and dirty ballast in the waters of other coun-
tries, however, the sanctions become more lenient: $500 for the first of-
fense, $1500 for the second, and $2500 for each subsequent offense.
1 69
Compared with the value of the vessel or the cargo (e.g. a 250,000 barrel
shipment valued at $30 a barrel represents a cargo worth $7,500,000.00),
these penalties are miniscule and constitute an exceedingly cheap license
to pollute.
Nominal sanctions such as these are contrary to Article VI of
OILPOL 54, to which Liberia is a contracting state. Article VI provides
that:
The penalties which may be imposed under the law of any of the territories
of a Contracting Government in respect of the unlawful discharge from a
ship of oil or oily mixture outside the territorial sea of that territory shall be
adequate in severity to discourage any such unlawful discharge and shall not
be less than the penalties which may be imposed under the law of that terri-
tory in respect of the same infringements within the territorial sea. [emphasis
supplied].
1 70
Tanker owners may appeal to Liberian courts for remission of these
modest sanctions. 71 Recalcitrant offenders are not encouraged to pay
penalties because non-payment results in maritime liens that are enforce-
able only in Liberian ports, and few of the offenders ever show up in
Monrovia.1 72 These nominal monetary penalties fall far short of the
most powerful enforcement tool, revocation of convenience registry.
The complaints submitted to Liberia by port and coastal states,
many of which are on record at the International Maritime Organization
in London, strongly suggest that Liberian flag vessels are responsible for
a large volume of intentional pollution discharges. 173 Liberian tankers
are continually suspected of intentional oil pollution in ports and coastal
waters from Le Havre to Yokohama. "The Liberian efforts to improve
their safety record have been notable more for the frequency with which
they are announced than for their success."' 74 Good public relations,
168 Liberian Mar. Reg. 2.83(3)(a) (Supp. 1981).
169 Liberian Mar. Reg. 2.83(3)(b) (Supp. 1981).
170 OILPOL 54, supra note 159, art. V1(2).
171 Liberian Mar. Reg. 2.83(3)(d) (Supp. 1981).
172 Id.
173 Appraisal of MEPC records at IMO headquarters, August 1982.
174 K. GRUNDY, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE IN 1978 (1979).
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effectuated by the Liberian Shipping Council, has eclipsed the actual rec-
ord of the bureau of Maritime Affairs in enforcing antipollution measures
under international and Liberian law.75
Norway
Norway reported thirteen violations involving vessels flying its flag;
in no instance was a penalty imposed. 176
Panama
Panama imposed fines on forty-four percent of the 170 violations
reported to it in 1980 and 1981. Eighty-five percent of the violations
involved oil record book deficiencies.
177
175 Id.
176 NORWEGIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING Mar. 4, 1979 to Nov. 20,
1979.




Discharge Oil Record Book Guilty Penalty Evidence Investigation
6 0 2 0 3 1
NORWEGIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980. Source: MEPC XVI/15/14
Annex II (Oct. 14, 1981).
Referred by Disposition
Japan 2 Insufficient evidence 3
Netherlands 2 Not guilty 2
U.K. 1 Under investigation 2
France 1 TOTAL 7
U.S. 1
TOTAL 7
177 PANAMANIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT IN FOUR INSTANCES DURING
1981.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/8 (Aug. 10, 1981).
With respect to complaints filed against four Panamanian flag vessels (CAREER, PALARU
BALI, GALUGAN, and GERALT OLDENDORF), all four were sanctioned and penalized in an
unspecified manner.
PANAMANIAN FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT DURING 1980-81.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/12 (Oct. 2, 1981).
For offenses alleged against Panamanian flag vessels in foreign waters, Panama reported the
following dispositions:
Number of Fines
Type of Offense Violations Imposed
Oil record book incomplete 35 16
Oil record book not on board 110 34






Poland reported that it dismissed one violation, and found a vessel
not guilty in another.
178
USSR
Coastal states in the preceding section reported eleven Soviet flag
vessel violations. The USSR reported only two of these dispositions.
179
4. Comparison of Port, Coastal and Flag State Enforcement
A comparison of the data of port state and flag state enforcement
reveals that there is a much more stringent application of penalties for,
OILPOL violations under the former. In the period from 1975 through
1982, ninety-two percent of all fines were imposed through port state
enforcement. Seventy-six percent of all complaints reported were as a
result of port state filings with IMO. The average port state fine was
thirty-two percent higher than the average flag state fine. 180
The following table provides a summary of the data discussed in the
preceding sections of this article.
The 20 fines imposed by Panama upon vessels flying her flag totaled U.S. $41,070, or an average
of U.S. $1,956 per violation. The largest such fine imposed was U.S. $7,500 for an oil discharge by
the OONG SUH in Canadian waters. The smallest such fines imposed were U.S. $500.
The average fine imposed for absence of an oil record book was U.S. $718; the average fine
imposed for an incomplete oil record book was U.S. $397.
Total fines collected by Panama during this two year period from vessels flying the Panamanian
flag was U.S. $71,820.
178 POLISH FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT IN TWO INSTANCES DURING 1980-81.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/1 (June 8, 1981).
With respect to a complaint filed by France in MEPC XV/11/2 (Jan., 1981) regarding a dirty
bilge discharge by a Polish vessel, Poland determined that the efficiency of the ship's oil separator
was within the requirements of OILPOL 54. No penalty was imposed.
With respect to a complaint filed by the Netherlands in MEPC XIII/13/7 (Apr. 18, 1980)
regarding a pollution discharge by a Polish vessel in a restricted area and use of an inefficient oil
separator, the case was dismissed because the six month statute of limitations had expired.
179 U.S.S.R. FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT ON TWO OCCASIONS.
Source: MEPC XVI/15/15 (Nov. 4, 1981).
With respect to the violations referred by the Federal Republic of Germany (MEPC XVI/15
Annex 2) (Jun. 8, 1981) and Australia (MEPC XVI/15/3 (Aug. 6, 1981)), the former Soviet vessel,
IOHANN MAH MASTAV, was found by the U.S.S.R. not to have violated its oil record book
violations, and the latter vessel, PIONER ESTONII, was sanctioned and punished in an unspecified
manner.
180 Averages from each country were averaged to achieve this statistic. The average fine per
complaint is U.S. $614 for flag state enforcement, and U.S. $559 for Coastal State referrals.
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TABLE XII
Comparison of Flag & Port State Enforcement
(Totals 1975-1982)
NO.
NO. COMPLAINTS TOTAL NO. COUNTRIES %
REPORTED FINES AVERAGE COUNTRIES CITED AS COMPLAINTS
(1975-1982) IMPOSED FINE PARTICIPATING VIOLATORS FINED
Port 1584 3,063,207 3,008 14 53 95%
Coastal 487 29,081 898 10 33 N/A
Flag 443 272,203 2,270 10 11 44%
One can only speculate as to why port state enforcement activities
are so much more stringent than flag state enforcement activities. One
reason may be the evidentiary problems incurred as a result of having to
prove a violation in a foreign jurisdiction. When a port state files a com-
plaint domestically, it can easily provide the witnesses, photographs and
chemical analyses; if however, it decides to refer the complaint back to
the state of registry, evidentiary hurdles become more significant.
Another reason why OILPOL 54 enforcement might be taken more
seriously by port states is that port states directly suffer the effects of the
pollution discharge, including the economic losses in their tourist and
fishing industries. Hence, they have a strong incentive to punish
OILPOL 54 offenders. In contrast, the economic interest of flag states
works in an opposite direction, since the flag state derives revenue (and
some level of international prestige) from vessel registration. Stringent
application of penalties against foreign discharges would only discourage
registration in the flag state and encourage registration in a more lenient
nation.
Finally, flag state enforcement ordinarly does nothing to clean flag
state waters. Thus, the economic interests of port states would mani-
festly encourage stringent enforcement, while the economic interests of
flag states would encourage precisely the opposite.
Some nations report both as flag and as port states. For example,
Greece, a nation with important tourist, fishing and shipping industries,
reported an average fine of $3,849 as a port state, but only $1,677 as a
flag state. In fact, ninty-six percent of all fines imposed by Greece were
through its port state enforcement vehcile. The United Kingdom also
imposed a higher percentage of fines against domestic complaints, and a
significantly lower percentage (although a higher average fine) against its
vessels as a result of forieng complaints. The following table identifies




Comparison: Different Activity under Port & Flag
Enforcement
AVERAGE
FINE IN NO. COMPLAINTS %
TOTAL UNITED REPORTED NO. COMPLAINTS
FINES STATES NO. OF AGAINST COMPLAINTS FINES
IMPOSED DOLLARS COMPLAINTS COUNTRY RECEIVED IMPOSED
GREECE
Port 1,546,654 3,849 412 113 - 100%
Flag 161.163 1,677 15 102 164 64%
U.K.
Port 499,632 2,636 290 65 - 98%
Flag 31,694 7,925 98 5 60 6%
IV. MARPOL 73/78
Since the TORREY CANYON disaster of 1967, IMO has intensi-
fied its efforts to fight marine pollution by ocean vessels.18 1 In 1973,
IMO convened the International Conference on Marine Pollution, whose
purpose was to update OILPOL 54 and make it more responsive to con-
temporary tanker practices. The Conference produced the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships ("MARPOL
73").112 MARPOL 73 has been described by IMO as "the most ambi-
tious international treaty covering maritime pollution ever adopted."
' 183
Its comprehensive jurisdiction embraces not only oil pollution, but all
forms of vessel pollution. Most of its technical requirements are set forth
in the five annexes to the convention, which address oil, chemicals, tanks
and containers, sewage and garbage, respectively. Only the first two or
these annexes need be adopted by a party to the Convention.
1 84
181 T. MCDURMAN, N. LETALIK, H. MILLS, D. JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE MARINE ENvIRON-
MENT AND THE CARACAS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1981) [hereinafter cited as
CARACAS CONVENTION].
182 Opened for signature Jan. 15, 1974, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1319 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MARPOL 73]. See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 60, at 68; IMCO Doe. MP/CONF/
WP 35 (Nov. 2, 1973).
183 MARPOL 73/78, 4 IMO NEws 10 (1982). Its drafters hoped that its promulgation might
result in "the complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and
other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental discharges of such substances." Men-
sah, International Environmental Law: International Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at Sea, 8
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 117 (1976) quoting International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution From Ships, May 2, 1973, IMCO Doe. MP/CONF/WP35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1319 (1973), fourth preamble paragraph.
184 MARPOL 73, supra note 182, at art. 14(1). The port state enjoys broad inspection opportuni-
ties under MARPOL. See id. art. 6(2). It can inspect the vessel's operating certificate issued by the
flag state. Where there "are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its equip-
ment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificate" or where the vessel
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In particular, Annex 1 maintains the oil discharge criteria of
OILPOL 54, but supersedes and tightens the criteria by reducing the
amount of oil and similar substances which can be discharged to 1/
30,000 of the cargo, and totally forbidding discharges in special areas,
including the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and the Persian
Gulf. Annex 1 also establishes construction requirements for such tech-
nological developments as load on top systems, oily water separating
equipment, double bottoms, and segregated ballast. Ports must install
reception facilities for contaminated ballast. The Annex retains the oil
record book requirement of OILPOL 54, insisting that all discharges be
recorded therein, and providing that any member state may freely in-
spect record book entries.
The compliance and enforcement provisions of MARPOL 73 are
similar to those of OILPOL 54. Article 4 of MARPOL 73 imposes a
regime of port and flag state enforcement of pollution violations. The
port state may impose sanctions under its laws for offenses occurring
within its jurisdiction, or it may refer the case to the flag state.185 The
state of registry, when informed of a violation, must institute enforce-
ment proceedings promptly, where it "is satisfied that sufficient evidence
is available to enable proceedings to be brought in respect of the alleged
violations .... ,186 It must also promptly inform the referring state and
the IMO of the action it has taken. 187 Where penalties are imposed by
the state of registry upon a vessel flying its flag, they must be "adequate
in severity to discourage violations of the present Convention and shall
be equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur."1 88
Although MARPOL 73 imposed little more in terms of compliance
and enforcement obligations than the requirements of OILPOL 54
(which seem to have been ignored or only cosmetically implemented by
many nations), the new convention was slow to be embraced by the
world community. Reluctance of nations to adopt MARPOL 73 was
attributed to several of the technical provisions of the Convention, in-
cluding those involving oily water separating equipment, port discharge
reception facilities and chemical tankers.1 89 As a result, the IMO con-
does not hold a proper certificate, the port state can conduct a more extensive examination of the
vessel, and/or prohibit the vessel from setting sail "until it can proceed to sea without presenting an
unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment." Id. at art. 5(2). See generally K.
HAKAPAA, supra note 94, at 173.
185 MARPOL 73, supra note 182, at art. 4.
186 Id. at art. 4(1). See also id. at art. 6(4).
187 Id. at art. 4(3).
188 Id. at art. 4(4).
189 MARPOL 73/78, 4 IMO NEws 11 (1982).
Oil Pollution
6:459(1984)
vened the International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Pre-
vention in 1978, which resulted in a Protocol 190 which effectively
absorbed the 1973 Convention and ameliorated its stringent technical re-
quirements. The resulting treaty is affectionately referred to as
MARPOL 73/78. It was ratified by a sufficient number of states and
entered into force on October 2, 1983.
The IMO Secretary-General Srivastava referred to MARPOL 73/78
as the most important and comprehensive international anti-pollution
treaty in history.19' It addresses not only the discharge of oil at sea, but
also prevents the discharge of any "harmful substance," a term which
includes "any substance which, if introduced into the sea, is liable to
create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life,
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the
sea. ... ,,192
MARPOL 73/78 supersedes OILPOL 54,193 but it is explicitly
designed to neither contradict nor conflict with the principles established
by the Law of the Sea Convention, as well as "the present or future
claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea or the
nature and extent of coastal and flag state jurisdiction."' 19 4 MARPOL
73/78 thus implicitly embraces the continuation of the legal fiction of
flags of convenience, and the related components of state sovereignty
over flag state vessels which conflict with its efforts to encourage compli-
ance with and enforcement of its pollution discharge requirements.
V. MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
Oil pollution from ships constitutes but a small portion of all con-
taminants spewed into the oceans. Most pollutants enter the sea after
being carried downstream from land-based sources.'95 Why then does
the recently promulgated Convention on the Law of the Sea' 96 ("LOS")
deal perfunctorily with land-based marine pollution while instituting a
complex and often contradictory jurisdictional regime for controlling oil
pollution from ships?
190 Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973, supra note 3.
191 MARPOL 73/78, 4 IMO NEWS 1 (1982).
192 MARPOL 73, supra note 182, at art. 2.
193 Id at art. 9(1).
194 Id. at art. 9(2). "Jurisdiction" is "construed in light of international law in force at the time of
application or interpretation of the present Convention." Iad at art. 9(3).
195 Kindt, The Effect of Claims by Developing Countries on LOS International Marine Pollution
Negotiations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 313 (1980).
196 Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.I, June 4, 1982 [hereinafter
cited as LOS].
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Despite the principles condemning transnational pollution adopted
in the Trail Smelter case'9 7 and its progeny, few nations are willing to
relinquish jurisdiction over inland polluters to an international regula-
tory agency, such as the International Seabed Authority. Controlling the
activities of oil tankers was a simpler question because jurisdiction on the
high seas has always been attenuated and open to negotiation. As a re-
sult, the LOS Convention contains a generalized statement of obligations
to control land-based marine pollution, 198 as well as a specific structure
for implementing restrictions on pollution by ships. 199
A. Vessel-Source Pollution: IMO's Responsibilities
Throughout its existence, the International Maritime Organization
has drafted and facilitated a variety of marine pollution conventions.
These conventions ordinarily contain a preliminary agreement on general
principles followed by highly technical annexes, which comprise the flesh
of the agreement. UNCLOS III did not supplant the technical standards
established by IMO, but instead established an international legal regime
in which they could be implemented. The conference thus re-examined
the rights and responsibilities of flag, port, and coastal states both to as-
sert jurisdiction and to enforce national anti-pollution laws against oil
tankers and other ocean vessels.2 °°
Under the LOS treaty, national laws and regulations must conform
to "generally accepted international rules and standards" 20 1 so as to
avoid a labyrinth of conflicting rules that would otherwise impede the
free flow of ocean commerce. Responsibility for establishing these stan-
dards, by which all national legislation will be evaluated, is given to
"the competent international organization or general diplomatic
conference.
' 202
Many commentators and at least one conference document indicate
that the competent international organization is the IMO.2°3 Although
197 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.) (1941) 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949). See
Dempsey, Oil Shale and Water Quality: Zhe Colorado Prospectus Under Federal, State and Interna-
tional Law, 58 DEN. L.J. 715, 744-46 (1981).
198 LOS, at art. 194.
199 LOS, at art. 211. See also Bernhardt, A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Pre-
scriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 265 (1980).
200 Cyon, Calming Troubled Waters: The Developing International Regime to Control Operations
Pollution, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35 (1980).
201 LOS, at art. 211(2). One commentator has suggested that this term "refers to the rules and
standards in relevant conventions which have duly entered into force." Valenzuela, supra note 5, at
7.
202 LOS, at art. 211(1).
203 See Kindt, supra note 195; Clingan, Jr., Environmental Problems and the New Order of the
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the major maritime nations, which dominate IMO, presumably would
agree to this reading, many developing and coastal nations may well dis-
pute this meaning.2' The less developed countries might instead prefer
to have environmental standards established in a forum where they have
more clout, such as the United Nations Environmental Programme
("UNEP"). °5 The unambiguous designation of an international regula-
tory-body is critical to the success of the anti-pollution regime. Individ-
ual states are relied upon to enact anti-pollution regulations, the
stringency of which must at least meet generally accepted world stan-
dards.20 6 Standards promoted by IMO may well reflect the active envi-
ronmental positions of developed coastal states, such as the United
States, Canada, and Australia. Because of their general perception that
environmental safety is a rich country's luxury, the less developed coun-
tries may prefer relatively lax regulations through those organizations
where they predominate.
The ambiguity of Article 211 is unsettling in this regard. If the
IMO is indeed to be the organization entrusted to establish environmen-
tal standards, why was it not so designated in the text?
B. LOS Provisions for a Prescriptive Regime
Whatever organization is finally entrusted with establishing interna-
tional standards, LOS will provide a "global matrix" within which envi-
ronmental standards can be prescribed and enforced by individual
states.2"7 The stringency of national regulations and the degree to which
they can be enforced will depend upon whether the nation is a flag, port,
or coastal state.20 8
1. Flag State Prescription
Traditionally, the flag state has exercised all rights and responsibili-
ties for the conduct of its vessels on the high seas. LOS has departed
Oceans, 15 COLUM. I. WORLD Bus. 45 (1980); E. GOLD, MARITIME TRANSPORT: THE EVOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL MARINE POLICY AND SHIPPING LAW 233-91 (1981); H. BURMESTER, VESSEL
SOURCE POLLUTION, OPS. 1:6 at 7 (1978); Report by Chairman of the Third Committee, Arab. A.
Yankov (Bulgaria), April 26, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.34 8 . See also Boehmer-Christian-
sen, Marine Pollution Control, 7 ENV. L. & POL. 71 (1981); McRae, The Law of the Sea Draft
Convention and International Organizations, 3 MARINE POL'Y REV. 1 (1980); Kingham & McRae,
Competent International Organizations and the Law of the Sea, MARINE POL'Y 106, 115-121 (April,
1979).
204 Bernhardt, supra note 199, at 274.
205 Kindt, supra note 195, at 319.
206 Bernhardt, supra note 199, at 274.
207 Clingan, supra note 203, at 45.
208 Id.
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from this tradition by affording certain rights to both port and coastal
states.2°9 However, as will be discussed below, these rights are shared
and may be pre-empted by the flag state.2a 0
Flag states that are parties to LOS are required to regulate their
vessels' discharge of pollutants into the ocean. These regulations must
"at least have the same effect as that of generally accepted international
rules and standards, '211 thereby insuring some minimum standard to
which all vessels must comply.
2. Port State Prescription
Port states may establish particular requirements for pollution con-
trol that vessels must meet as a condition of entry to harbors and off-
shore facilities.21 2 Adequate notice of these requirements must be com-
municated through the competent international organization. However,
the right of innocent passage by vessels, which is vaguely defined in the
convention, must not be impinged.21 3
3. Coastal State Prescription
Coastal states may assert differing degrees of jurisdiction depending
on whether the passing ship is within territorial waters (which extend
twelve miles from continental baselines) 214 or within the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (the EEZ, which extends 200 miles from continental
209 One commentator summarized the metamorphosis from virtually exclusive flag state jurisdic-
tion, to a regime of shared jurisdiction in the LOS Convention as follows:
Pollution regulations on vessels traditionally have been enforced, exclusively or primarily, by
the flag state. Coastal states did have enforcement rights over foreign vessels where a violation
of pollution regulations had been committed within their waters, and particularly within their
ports. Pollution violations in the territorial sea could also be punished by the coastal State,
unless it could be claimed that the vessel was simply exercising its right of innocent passage.
The traditional concept of innocent passage included very few environmental elements, and it is
even doubtful whether an operational discharge during passage could justify coastal State en-
forcement. Thus, the coastal State could do very little in practice ...
This system, based predominantly on flag State enforcement, was severely criticized by
environmentally oriented coastal States as being highly ineffective. . . . [Tihere was little ques-
tion that the whole enforcement system for vessel-source pollution needed radical reformation.
G. TIMAGENIS, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF MARINE POLLUTION 34 (1977).
210 G.J. MANGONE, LAW FOR THE WORLD OCEAN 281 (1981). Several commentators have
noted that the negotiation of the LOS Convention was characterized by a bloc confrontation over the
issue of marine pollution by ocean vessels, in which "the maritime states have sought to maintain
their traditional, and virtually unfettered, navigational rights and the coastal states have been con-
cerned primarily with environmental protection." CARACAS CONVENTION, supra note 181, at 17.
This dichotomy is reflected in the Convention.
211 LOS, at art. 211(2). See Valenzuela, supra note 5, at 11.
212 LOS, at art. 211(3).
213 Id.





Within their territorial seas, coastal states may adopt any anti-pollu-
tion regulations that do not hamper innocent passage of foreign ves-
sels.2 16  In the EEZ, these regulations must conform to generally
accepted international standards, as must those of flag and port states.217
Where necessary, the coastal state may petition the international organi-
zation to permit more stringent regulations for particular areas in the
EEZ. These regulations must be approved by the organization on the
basis of the area's peculiar ecological or maritime traffc conditions.
218
C. LOS Provisions for an Enforcement Regime
Like prescription, enforcement powers for vessel-source pollution
are not entrusted to a single international agency, but are the responsibil-
ity of each nation party to the convention. Powers that have tradition-
ally been exclusive flag state powers have been distributed to port and
coastal states. Nevertheless, flag states safeguards may significantly cur-
tail enforcement in practice.219
1. Flag State Enforcement
In addition to effectively enforcing international standards, flag
states have an obligation to prevent polluting ships from sailing.220 Viola-
tions by nationally-registered ships require the flag state to investigate
and, where appropriate, institute proceedings, especially when so re-
quested by a port or coastal state.221 Penalties imposed by flag states
must adequately discourage violations.222
2. Port State Enforcement
The provisions for port state enforcement of environmental regula-
tions, proposed by the United States during the conference, are poten-
tially the strongest anti-pollution regime in LOS.223 This scheme permits
port state jurisdiction over discharge violations that occur on the high
215 LOS, at art. 57.
216 LOS, at art. 211(4).
217 LOS, at art. 211(5).
218 LOS, at art. 211(6).
219 Bernhardt, supra note 199, at 307.
220 LOS, at art. 217(2).
221 LOS, at art. 217(4) and (6).
222 LOS, at art. 217(8).
223 Cyon, supra note 200, at 49; Bernhardt supra note 199, at 284. See generally K. HAKAPAA,
supra note 94, at 173-78. One commentator has noted that, "it seems to have bien accepted without
question that the port State has complete jurisdictional and enforcement powers over violations com-
mitted in its internal waters or territorial sea." Valenzuela, supra note 5, at 11.
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seas or in the waters of other nations (violations within the port state's
waters are subject to its own jurisdiction as a coastal state).2 24 At the
request of another nation, the port state may investigate such allegations
and begin judicial proceedings against the offending ship.2 However,
investigation and prosecution by the port state must be terminated when
the ship's flag state asks that these matters be transferred to the flag
state's jurisdiction.226 Port states may also prevent an unseaworthy ves-
sel in its ports from sailing until repairs have been made.
227
3. Coastal State Enforcement
As in the prescriptive regime, coastal state enforcement powers are
determined by the foreign vessel's presence in either the territorial sea or
the EEZ. Within its territorial sea, a coastal state may physically in-
spect, institute proceedings, and even detain a vessel. The coastal state
must have "clear grounds" for believing that a violation has occurred.22
Enforcement powers lessen when the vessel is in the EEZ. There, the
coastal state may only request information about the vessel, including its
next destination, presumably so that port state enforcement can be re-
quested.229 When the coastal state has reason to believe the information
given by the vessel is false, it may demand a physical inspection of the
ship for suspected violations within the EEZ.23 ° The existence of "clear
objective evidence" that a vessel is responsible for a discharge violation
that has caused or threatened to cause major damage enables a coastal
state to institute proceedings and detain the vessel. The power may be
exercised for violations occurring in either the territorial sea or the
EEZ.23 1
Unfortunately, these powers are significantly weakened by a flag
state escape hatch whereby coastal states may not detain a vessel that is
internationally bonded against violations.232 Considering the extraordi-
nary cost of delay to the ship's charterer, most vessels will be indemnified
for polluting discharges.
224 LOS, at art. 218(1), (2); art. 220(1).
225 LOS, at art. 218(1).
226 LOS, at art. 218(4).
227 LOS, at art. 219. See CARACAS CONVENTION, supra note 181, at 34-35.
228 LOS, at art. 220(2). See generally, K. HAKAPAA, supra note 94, at 195-99, 242-45.
229 LOS, at art. 220(3).
230 LOS, at art. 220(5).
231 LOS, at art. 220(6).
232 LOS, at art. 220(7).
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D. Flag State Preemption Under LOS Article 228
The Law of the Sea Convention gives port and coastal states the
authority, under certain circumstances, to apprehend and prosecute ves-
sels that pollute within their waters.233 This apparent victory for envi-
romental interests is threatened, however, by an escape hatch provision
that permits flag states to preempt criminal proceedings filed against
their ships.
In what has been described as one of the most "controversial" of the
compliance and enforcement provisions of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion,234 Article 228 provides, inter alia, that proceedings by port or
coastal states against foreign vessels for pollution violations beyond the
territorial sea: "shall be suspended upon the taking of proceedings to
impose penalties in respect of corresponding charges by the flag state
within six months of the date on which proceedings were first insti-
tuted. '235  Although port and coastal states will continue to exercise
complete jurisdiction for pollution violations within their territorial sea,
those that occur in the exclusive economic zone ("EEZ"), a mere twelve
miles from shore, fall within the discretionary purview of the vessel's flag
state.
This would present no problem if all flag states conscientiously met
their international legal obligations to prosecute polluters. But as prior
sections of this article have revealed, these obligations are often observed
less than enthusiastically. Flag state investigations are often lengthy and
236 W e iltr rseldom result in convictions. When violators are found guilty, the
penalty may well be less than that essential to deter future violations.237
233 LOS, at art. 218 & 220.
234 G. TIMAGENIS, supra note 209, at 38.
235 LOS, at art. 228.
236 Analysis of records at IMO headquarters, August 1982.
237 Id. See also Liberian Mar. Reg. 2.83(3)(a) (Supp. 1981). For example, Liberia regularly fines
polluting vessels only U.S. $600 for violations occurring beyond its own territorial sea.
At the Conference's first session in Caracas during 1974, the previous intransigence of Canada
and other environmentalist coastal states had softened. Coastal states were prepared to accept less
than full coastal state authority to replace the traditional maritime regime, which entrusted exclusive
jurisdiction with the flag state. In return for sharing authority with flag and port states, the coastal
states sought powers where strictly necessary to protect geographic, navigational, or ecological situa-
tions inadequately covered by international rules and standards. Statement by Leonard H. Legault
(Canada), Committee III, July 16, 1974, reprinted in Miles, An Interpretation of the Caracas Proceed-
ings, LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 83 (Christy, Gamble, Knight & Miles ed. 1975).
Major flag states, including Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany, still opposed any
regime that included coastal powers over foreign ships. Id See also U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/
L.6, July 31, 1974. This dissatisfaction may have accounted for the appearance of the flag state
preemption clause in the Revised Single Negotiating Text ("RSNT") that was issued in 1976. Re-
vised Single Negotiating Text, Part III, art. 38, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1, May 6, 1976,
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Flag state preemption can be denied in only three situations. First,
violations occurring with a coastal state's territorial sea need not be re-
ferred to the flag state for prosecution.238 Second, the flag state may not
preempt proceedings if "proceedings relate to a case of major damage to
the coastal State." Third, flag state preemption will be denied where "the
flag state in question has repeatedly disregarded its obligations to enforce
effectively the applicable international rules and standards in respect of
violations by its vessels.,
239
Although these exceptions have been part of the preemption clause
since it was introduced, they have received remarkably little comment.240
The major damage provision has little practical significance. Intentional
vessel discharges are harmful in the aggregate; but single incidents rarely
cause substantial damage. Coastal states already possess the right to pro-
tect their shorelines from casualty under the Intervention Convention, a t
hence, the exception provides no improvement in that regard.
The remaining exception is plagued by qualifications. How does one
define repeated disregard and effective enforcement? Both terms are suffi-
ciently ambiguous to invite incompatible, if not contradictory, interpreta-
tions from national courts.
Presuming that marine pollution conventions established by the
IMO, such as OILPOL 54242 and MARPOL 73/78,243 are accepted as
the basis for a global prescriptive regime, 2' then the vessel source pollu-
reprinted in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 582 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S.
Lay ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as RSNT].
No such provision appeared in the first instrument of the Conference, the Informal Single Nego-
tiating Text ("SNT") produced during the first and second sessions. The clause was unchanged for
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text ("ICNT"). Informal Single Negotiating Text, Part III,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, May 7, 1975, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEG. MAT. 743 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SNT]. It remains intact as Article 228 of the Convention signed in Jamaica in December
of 1982. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, art. 228, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 1,
April 28, 1979, reprinted in 10 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 134 (M. Nordquist & E.
Simmonds ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
238 LOS, at art. 228.
239 Id.
240 McManus, Environmental Provisions in the Revised Single Negotiating Text, in LOS: CON-
FERENCE OUTCOMES AND PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION 269 (Gamble & Miles ed. 1977).
241 International Convention Relating to intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068.
242 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done May 12,
1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900; as amended Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No.
6109; Oct. 21, 1969, IMCO Dec. A VI/Res. 175, Jan. 17, 1970; Oct. 15, 1971, IMCO Doc. A VII/
Res. 232, 247, Nov. 3, 1971.
243 Protocol Relating to the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, entered into
force Oct. 1, 1983, IMCO Doc. TSPP/CONF/l1 (1978).
244 This intent has been affirmed by commentators, conference delegates, and officials at IMO.
See H. BURMESTER, supra note 203; E. GOLD, supra note 203; Clingan, supra note 203; Kindt, supra
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tion records compiled by the Marine Environmental Protection Commit-
tee could be employed to establish a flag state's failure to meet
international obligations. For example, a state that rarely responds to
requests for pollution investigations may demonstrate repeated disregard
of its obligations. Nominal or cosmetic fines for violations (such as the
maximum fine permitted under Liberian law of $500) may be deemed to
constitute ineffective enforcement. Despite the avowed inaccuracy of
these records,245 they may constitute the only evidence available to deter-
mine whether a flag state has met its international duties to control pollu-
tion from its ships. If this rationale is accepted by national courts, the
flag state preemption clause would not completely nullify the coastal en-
forcement powers conferred by the Law of the Sea.
E. Weaknesses of the LOS Regime
The LOS regime for controlling vessel-source marine pollution is, in
the words of one commentator, "extremely complex, contradictory, eva-
sive, and even unintelligible."246 Principal among its shortcomings are
1) the failure to specify the source of international environmental stan-
dards, 2) the non-obligatory provisions for port state enforcement, and
3) flag state preemption of port and coastal state proceedings.247 The
oblique designation of IMO as an international rule-maker has already
been discussed.
The provisions for port state enforcement have been weakened be-
cause the port state is not required to honor a coastal state's request to
investigate discharge violations.24 Port state enforcement is preferable
to coastal state enforcement because it imposes a minimal interference
with shipping: vessels are apprehended at their destinations rather than
in transit.
Both enforcement regimes may effectively be gutted, however, by
the flag state's ability to preempt investigations and proceedings against
polluting vessels.249 At the flag state's request, port and coastal states
must transfer proceedings to the flag-state, perhaps for more conciliatory
treatment. One commentator, J. Peter Bernhardt, who rarely minces
words when writing about marine policy, has called flag state preemption
note 195; Report by Chairman of the Third Committee, supra note 203; Interviews with members of
the IMO Secretariat, in London, England, Aug. 15-Sept. 3, 1982.
245 Documents of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee, IMO.
246 Bernhardt, supra note 199, at 266.
247 id. at 308.
248 Id. at 284.
249 LOS, at art. 228.
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"a mockery of port State and coastal State enforcement. ' 250 As a result,
the LOS treatment of vessel-source pollution founders because of the
conference's unwillingness to provide adequate enforcement powers.2 5'
F. The Politics of Economics at LOS
Bernhardt blames the failure of the vessel-source pollution regime
on the political disagreement between maritime states and environmen-
tally active coastal states. The dispute centered on: (1) the desire of mar-
itime nations to preserve effective freedom of navigation v. the desire of
coastal states to protect their environments; and (2) the maritime com-
munity's preference for global standards v. the coastal states' preference
for unilateral anti-pollution regulations. Confronted with these differ-
ences of opinion, a working program could not be established by the con-
sensus method adopted at LOS.252
Delegates to the Law of the Sea Conference have often acted accord-
ing to national self-interest. The marine pollution section of LOS is in
this way no different from the more highly politicized issue of deep sea-
bed mining. As one commentator has noted, UNCLOS III participants
"often base their support or opposition to claims according to the eco-
nomic benefits each country expects to receive from exploitation of ocean
resources." 253 Just as maritime nations defend flag state enforcement as
a means of protecting economic interests in shipping, so coastal states
have asserted jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone to claim liv-
ing and mineral ocean resources.
Many coastal nations, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and countries throughout Africa and the Third World, have
unilaterally extended their jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea by cre-
250 Bernhardt, supra note 199, at 308.
251 However, at least one commentator has pointed out that, insofar as maritime pollution by
ocean vessels is concerned, "port and coastal states have potentially won significant concessions
which take the international control regime some distance beyond what was acceptable to maritime
interests during the early seventies. Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 203, at 74.
252 Bernhardt, supra note 199, at 267-8. However, unlike UNCLOS I and II, issues of maritime
transport did not dominate UNCLOS III. In the post-WWII era, the legal policies of maritime
transport have been increasingly isolated in private international law directed by organizations such
as the Comite Maritime International ("CMI") and the International Chamber of Shipping ("ICS").
Public international law has redirected its emphasis to the competing area of ocean resources utiliza-
tion. See E. GOLD, supra note 203, at 233-291. Although maritime interests will benefit from the
additional safeguards for freedom of navigation, the treaty as a whole is preoccupied with establish-
ing a framework in which ocean resources, such as fisheries and manganese nodules, rather than
transportation, can be developed.
253 Kindt, supra note 195.
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ating pollution control zones.254 Although these countries agree that
they are entitled to certain rights in the use of ocean resources, they differ
on the extent of their obligation to protect and preserve the marine envi-
ronment.255 In the industrialized nations, environmental efforts are
either sincere efforts to protect the marine ecology or more parochial
urges to defend the nations' environment.256 In either case, those efforts
are often effective. The less developed countries, however, regard envi-
ronmental problems as secondary to their urgent economic needs,257 and
thus favor a lenient environmental obligation for themselves.
Under principles first announced at the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on the Human Environment, the less developed countries have developed
a double standard that permits them to subordinate environmental re-
sponsibilities to economic growth while obliging the industrialized world
to assume more stringent anti-pollution responsibilities.258 These princi-
ples include the following:
1) Most environmental problems in developing countries are caused by
under-development and not pollution.2 59
2) The first responsibility of developing countries is to their own economic
254 Kindt, Special Claims Impacting Upon Marine Pollution Issues at the Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.L 397, 437-42 (1980).
255 Law of the Sea Convention, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP., art. 56 June 4, 1982.
256 Kindt, supra note 195, at 315.
257 Id. at 318.
258 Latin American and African nations, which predominate in the developing Group of 77, have
espoused coastal priorities throughout UNCLOS III so as to claim jurisdiction over offshore re-
sources. Paradoxically, the United States initiated the evolution of coastal rights by the Truman
Proclamation of 1945, which asserted United States control over the resources of the continental
shelf seabed, but not the waters above it. As the United States directed greater attention to ocean
resources than maritime transport, Latin American nations fully developed the concept of the EEZ,
which constitutes a major aspect of LOS. E. GOLD, supra note 203, at 253-54. Africa and other
members of the Group of 77 joined the developed maritime nations, such as the United States,
Canada, and Australia, in asserting coastal rights.
Whereas the developed coastal states complemented their jurisdictional ambitions with a strong
interest in preserving the marine environment, the LDC's interpreted environmental safeguards as
diverging from developmental interests. Kindt, supra note 195, at 315. Their position on this issue
has been clear from their behavior since the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.
For example, the developing countries in the United Nations Environmental Programme wanted
assurances that environmental protection would result in neither undesirable economic effects on
their infant economies nor a reduction in international aid for development. Id. at 319. The fear has
been that developed countries, which had industrialized without the additional costs of environmen-
tal protection, would continue to outpace the LDC's by burdening them with anti-pollution regula-
tions.
The voting power of the development countries was able to subordinate the environmental
problems of development to economic problems at UNEP. Id. at 320. See Founex Report, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.48/10 Annex I (1974); 3 ENv'T L. REv. 695 (1972). The effect was noted at UN-
CLOS III.
259 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doe. A/
CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1, art. 1(4) June 10, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1416 (1972).
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growth.26 °
3) Price fixing for raw materials is an integral part of the developing
world's program for environmental management.2 6 1
4) The environmental policies of all countries should not hamper the in-
dustrialization of the developing world.26 2
As part of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), these princi-
ples reflect the Third World's desire for assurance that marine conserva-
tion will not adversely affect development and that financial and
technical assistance from the industrial countries will not be reduced.2 63
The principles have become firmly entrenched in the Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOS).264
For example, LOS Article 194 provides that states shall act to pre-
vent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment, "using for
this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accord-
ance with their capabilities. '265 Developing countries would thus be per-
mitted to pollute to the extent of their level of development, despite the
influx of technical assistance being pledged by industrialized countries.26 6
While the industrialized world would be obligated to comply with the
full measure of environmental responsibilities imposed by LOS, the de-
veloping countries would enjoy large capital infusions and relaxed anti-
pollution standards.267
This double standard could result in a flag of convenience phenome-
non among developing countries, who could peddle their preferential sta-
tus to multinational companies searching for industrial sites with relaxed
anti-pollution standards. More importantly for the shipping industry,
the double standard could enable developing countries to enforce vessel-
260 Id. at 11(7).
261 Id. at I(10).
262 Id. at n(11).
263 Kindt, supra note 195, at 319.
264 At the 1974 Caracas session, where most of the informal wrangling over marine pollution was
done, an environmental double standard whereby LDC's would work under less stringent regula-
tions than the developed countries was openly advocated. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 75
(1975). That sentiment is found in Article 194 of the draft convention, in which states are obliged to
control marine pollution "in accordance with their capabilities." LOS, at art. 194(1).
One year later, the Group of 77 succeeded in linking the law of the sea to the issue of global
wealth redistribution, an objective of the New International Economic Order ("NIEO"). At the
Geneva session in 1975, the Algerian delegation persuaded the LDC's to link the exploitation of
seabed resources to a system of global commodity control within NIEO. The end, of course, was to
maintain prices for raw materials exported from the developing world. Many Group of 77 delega-
tions considered this arrangement the price for permitting the developed world to retain freedom of
navigation through straits used in international navigation. Kindt, supra note 195, at 321.
265 LOS, at art. 196.
266 Id. at art. 202, 203.
267 Kindt, supra note 195, at 316.
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source pollution regulations more strictly against the industrialized coun-
tries than against themselves. Such discriminatory enforcement would
completely discredit the provisional coastal enforcement regime of LOS
and perpetuate the traditional, often unresponsive, flag state enforcement
system.
Ironically, the developing countries have little to gain from lax envi-
ronmental regulation. Few of them share ocean space with environmen-
tally active industrialized countries. Most are neighbors of other
underdeveloped countries, each of whom will be permitted to continue
polluting as their economies grow.26 Although the developing countries
have adopted the "common heritage of mankind" as their rallying call at
the LOS negotiations, the anti-pollution double standard indicates their
belief that "the economic 'property of all' be the environmental responsi-
bility of none." '2 69
G. The Refusal of the United States to Ratify LOS
Fifteen years ago, Maltese ambassador Arvid Pardo called on the
United Nations General Assembly to preserve the potential riches of the
deep seabed and ocean floor as "the common heritage of mankind."2 7 0
With the development of seabed mining techniques by technologically
advanced countries, Presidents Lyndon Johnson27 and Richard
Nixon 272 proposed international regimes to oversee production of man-
ganese nodules. Now, after nine years of lengthy negotiation, the future
of the Law of the Sea Convention is uncertain because of a change of
leadership and a change of heart in Washington.
Shortly after the Reagan Administration took office, the State De-
partment announced that it would comprehensively review the draft con-
vention to certify its agreement with American economic and defense
interests.273 Because the review would not be completed before the late
summer of 1981, the LOS Conference could not finish its work during
the tenth session as had been planned. This apparent decision to post-
pone signature of the Convention was underscored by the replacement of
several key members of the American delegation, including the acting
268 Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 264.
269 Kindt, supra note 195, at 315.
270 Statement by Ambassador Arvid Pardo (Malta), Note Verbale, Aug. 17, 1967, U.N. Doc. A/
6695 (1967).
271 Richardson, LOS in the Making: A Universal Regime for Deep Seabed Mining? 53 N.Y.
STATE BAR J. 408, 410 (1981).
272 Nixon Proposal, May 23, 1970, in 6 NEW DIRECIoNs IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (1981).
273 N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, at Al.
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ambassador to the Conference.274 Members of foreign delegations were
aghast at this sudden change in United States policy, which was recog-
nized as "a question of both substance and process" by the developing
countries.275 Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, who would soon
replace the late Ambassador Amersignhe of Sri Lanka as president of the
Conference, called the United States review a major setback, but optimis-
tically observed that the Americans would soon settle their difficulties
with the draft convention.276
They did not. After a protracted review of the convention, and de-
spite a whirlwind round of last-minute talks in April 1982,277 President
Reagan announced on August 9, 1982, that the United States would not
sign the Law of the Sea Convention.278 Two reasons were given: first, as
early as 1981 there were suspicions that the draft convention was not in
agreement with Reagan's enunciated goals; second, both industry and
Congress had criticized the prospective deep seabed mining regime as
overly restrictive of private investment.279 The importance of deep sea
mining has been overstated, especially in comparison to the convention's
work in ocean resources and marine conservation;280 but it was on this
issue that the President chose to make his stand. Only minor, essentially
technical revisions were felt necessary for the section on marine pollution
and scientific research,28 1 and even the President admitted that "most
provisions are acceptable and consistent with United States interests.
28 2
The structure of the international body to supervise deep sea mining,
however, finally proved unacceptable to the Administration.283
Much of the international criticism has regarded the United States
policy review as an abrogation of the consensus approach by which the
274 Richardson, supra note 271, at 408.
275 Statement by Mr. Imam Ul-Haque (Pakistan), Informal Plenary, Aug. 10, 1981, in Oxman,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1982).
276 N.Y. Times, March 5, 1981, at A4.
277 N.Y. Times, April 2, 1982, at A5, and April 7, 1982, at A9.
278 Telephone Interview by Mark Trophagen with Sally Meese, Office of Ocean Law and Policy,
U.S. Department of State, Oct. 1, 1982.
279 Malone, U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea, 81 STATE DEPT. BuLL. 48 (July, 1981).
280 Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York
Sessions, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977).
281 Malone, supra note 279, at 49.
282 Presidents Statement, U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea, 82 STATE DEPT. BULL. 54 (March
1982).
283 As one of a handful of countries with the scientific expertise and financial backing needed for
a successful ocean mining program, the U.S. has throughout the Conference attempted to protect
American investors from cumbersome economic restraints proposed by the developing world. To
insure that seabed mineral resources would be used for the common benefit of mankind, the U.S. and
other Western nations envisaged the International Seabed Authority as an international licensing
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Conference was run. To create a truly global regime, it was thought that
as many nations as possible should become parties to the final Law of the
Sea Convention. To accomplish this, a procedural device was needed
through which the developing world could not effectively tyrannize the
Conference by wielding its secure voting majority and by which the diffi-
culties of gaining unanimity could be avoided. The result was the so-
called consensus rule, by which strong disagreement could be mollified.
Pure consensus is a tribal decision process in which voting is forestalled
so that general agreement can be reached.
The procedural rules of the Conference provided for a vote to be
taken after effort had been made to reach agreement.2 84 This was the
"Gentlemen's Agreement," reached at the Conference nineteenth meet-
ing on June 27, 1974:
The Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on sub-
stantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no voting on such
matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.285
Although the Rules of Procedure do not refer to consensus, an actual
bureau which would approve private work projects, enforce environmental standards, and perhaps
distribute a percentage of profits to Third World countries. Richardson, supra note 271, at 440.
This notion sharply contrasted with that held by the Group of 77 (now numbering over 100),
which insisted that the mining regime be an instrument for the New International Economic Order.
From this perspective, only a monopolistic, parastatal entity could provide both profits and control
to the developing world. Id. Although a compromise reached in 1978 provided that private compa-
nies would work alongside the international Enterprise, the agreement broke down over details.
Among those provisions which the U.S. found unacceptable are:
" Eventual monopolization of the deep sea mining industry by the Enterprise, thus preventing
private investment.
" Uncertainty concerning U.S. participation in the governing Council of the International
Seabed Authority, compared with guaranteed seats for the Soviet Union and its
dependencies.
" Production ceilings fixed to land-based nickel production, intended to artificially maintain
high prices to several mineral rich developing nations.
" Possible profit-sharing with national liberation movements, such as the Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization.
" Compulsory transfers of technology to the Authority, which would distribute the informa-
tion to all member states without charge.
Presidents Statement, supra note 282.
These substantive questions have been left unresolved by the decision to withdraw from the
Conference. Important procedural questions have been provoked by the U.S. move, as well as inter-
national indignations. Despite these controversies, the Reagan administration appears willing to
bear the consequences. As James Malone, the last U.S. ambassador to the Conference, commented,
"the Administration has decided that it would be better to face criticism in the United Nations than
to proceed prematurely to finalize a treaty that might fail to further our national interests." Malone,
supra note 279, at 48.
284 Note, Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the Consensus Rule,
69 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (1975).
285 Rules of Procedure and Gentlemen's Agreement, June 27, 1974, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/
Rev. 1, reprinted in 13 Irrr'L LEG. MAT. 1199 (1974).
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link exists between them and the Gentlemen's Agreement.286 In this
way, "consensus has become a concept of positive law, even if. . .it has
been done 'on the quiet!' "287 Consensus is not synonymous with una-
nimity, but instead constitutes a very considerable convergence of opin-
ion and the absence of any delegation's strong disagreement, however
few in number.
28
The developing nations alleged that the United States, by con-
ducting a policy review of the draft convention with an aim to further
negotiations, was destroying the agreements that had already been
reached on the deep seabed mining regime, as represented by the draft
convention.2 89
With the adoption of the draft convention by the Conference Ple-
nary in 1982 and the refusal by the United States to sign it, the issue
seems moot, for the effort to establish a global regime is rapidly unravel-
ling. Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have
enacted unilateral legislation concerning deep seabed mining. France,
Belgium, and the United Kingdom have been considering similar legisla-
tion. The result could be what the Conference has tried so long to pre-
vent: an exclusive, collaborative ocean mining arrangement among the
industrialized nations of the West.290 It seems ironic that the Conference
achieved agreement on virtually all other issues, including those involv-
286 Note, supra note 284, at 125.
287 Id.
283 Id. at 124.
289 Oxman, supra note 275, at 5. Ambassador Jens Evenson of Norway voiced this belief-
If one main state or group of states rescind one main element of the package, the whole
package would fall apart and the compromise package elaborated with such finesse, perhaps
even ingenuity, over the years would collapse like a house of cards. A lack of understanding of
this main element of the gentlemen's agreement by all in 1973 would spell disaster for the
consensus principle.
Statement by Ambassador Evenson (Norway), Aug. 10, 1981, Informal Plenary, in Oxman, supra
note 275, at 4.
Despite this, the United States maintains that it remained committed to the consensus process
throughout its review. President's Statement, supra note 282. In fact, one of the principle reasons
given for the review was the unlikeliness that the draft convention would ever gain the advice and
consent of the Senate. Id. In this regard, the United States may conceivably have been under an
obligation to conduct a review and renegotiate to produce a convention acceptable to the Senate. As
Professor Riphagen of the Netherlands commented:
We remain under the duty to strive for a generally acceptable regime of the seas, in other
words towards consensus. . . . We are not drafting a manifesto, to which some may attach
their signatures and others not, but we are trying to lay down a legal regime, which by that very
token must work in the present-day world, which means that it must be accepted by all
concerned.
Statement by Professor Riphagen (Netherlands), Informal Meeting, Aug. 17, 1981, in Oxman, supra
note 275, at 9.
290 Richardson, supra note 271, at 441. See U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1401 (1982), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1003 (1980).
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ing maritime pollution.291 The first international effort to prescribe a
prospective system for the seas may be crippled because of fear and greed
in both the industrialized and developing worlds for minerals whose
value has yet to be proven.
V. CONCLUSION
It lies well within man's intelligence and ability to make the surface
of this planet a Garden of Eden, or a dry, dead desert. Similarly, he can
make the oceans an abundant paradise of life to feed his children and
grandchildren, or a cesspool which will ultimately ensure his demise and
agonizing extinction. In order to achieve short term economic benefits,
he seems to be sacrificing the long term ecological balance. More of our
land is becoming desert; more of our seas are becoming cesspools. Man
the creator-the wonder who gave himself riches beyond comprehension,
who conquered the Earth and all living things upon it, who explored the
infinite with abundant talent and hope, created the technology to destroy
it all. While consciously determined to avoid a thermonuclear holocaust,
he seems unconsciously to have acquiesced in an unintended side effect of
pursuing economic objectives. While he would prefer not to see the
world end with a bang, he seems somewhat reconciled to the notion that
it may well end with a whimper. Nature is cruel-those species with
fatal defects perish. Is man such a creature?
We have it within our power to make of the Earth whatever we
choose. If we do not choose a paradise (and fail to pursue that objective
with the dedication of our considerable talents and abilities), we will rele-
gate our existence to whatever direction the winds of fate (i.e., the laws of
Nature) choose to blow us. If we are negligent, they could blow us into
thermonuclear extinction, or toward a vile, suffering world abundant
with seas of carcinogens. Which direction?
As this article has indicated, port state enforcement seems to pro-
vide an efficient, effective, expeditious, and equitable means of rectifying
the problem of environmental injury within a state's territorial waters.
But the legal fiction of flags of convenience, as well as overriding eco-
nomic considerations, inhibit the effectiveness of a regime of flag state
enforcement over violations in the "commons" of the high seas. This is
the legal regime upon which the international community seems so
blindly to rely.
The world community has promulgated a number of multilateral
291 Oxman, supra note 275.
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conventions which condemn pollution of the maritime environment.2 92
Several commentators have pointed out that the major defect of the ex-
isting marine pollution conventions, particularly those drafted by the
IMO, is that they have relied largely upon flag states for enforcement
while affording coastal states no explicit opportunity to engage in "self
help," even in the defined "prohibited zones." '2 9 3
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the conventions fail to
address the issue of insufficient compliance by flag states29 4 of their en-
forcement obligations.29 It has been pointed out that the IMO faces an
important challenge in this area:
The crucial political fight affecting [IMO] at present, and for the forseeable
future, concerns the effectiveness of the flag state system for ensuring com-
pliance with the highest practical standards affording protection to coastal
and port states. The credibility of the entire regulatory system continues to
be at stake.
2 9 6
If IMO is unable to deal effectively with the enforcement problems sur-
rounding its antipollution regulations, it is quite likely that a growing
number of coastal states will take unilateral actions to protect their
marine environments.297
We stand on the threshold of a new international legal order, one
292 Among these antipollution conventions is the Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (consummated in Stockholm on June 16, 1972), which adopted several
resolutions relevant to the instant inquiry:
The protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the
well being of peoples and economic development throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of
the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments.
The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances. . . in such quantities or concentra-
tions as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in
order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just
struggle of the peoples of all countries against pollution should be supported.
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to
create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and [the marine environment].
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/
Rev. 1. See CARACAS CONVENTION, supra note 181, at 16-17.
293 J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNA-
TIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 92-93 (1979).
294 Id. at 93. See also Goldie, Development of an International Environmental Law-An Ap-
praisal, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 104, 118 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972);
CARACAS CONVENTION, supra note 181, at 30; Wittig, supra note 56, at 126-27; Juda, supra note 56,
at 576-77.
295 G. TIMAGENIS, supra note 209, at 34.
296 Address by Edward Miles, 14th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, in Kiel,
W. Germany, (Oct. 20-23, 1980); (On the Roles of International Organizations in the New Ocean
Regime 21); for a defense of the flag state enforcement regime, see Address by F.L. Wiswall, Jr.,
'Shipcare '82', in Hamburg, W. Germany (March 19, 1982) (Port State Enforcement of IMCO-
Originating Safety Legislation-A Liberian Perspective).
297 Juda, supra note 56, at 583.
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based on two recently promulgated multilateral conventions of vast sig-
nificance to the maritime environment-MARPOL 73/78 and LOS.
IMO's strictest environmental convention is the International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78). This
agreement attempts to eliminate dirty ballast discharge and promote pol-
lution-free technology by a system of flag state certification and port state
inspection. Although its enforcement provisions are perhaps more satis-
factory than those employed in previous conventions, they may still lack
adequate mechanisms to deter pollution. A port state may detain a ship
only when there exists "clear grounds for believing that the condition of
the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with the par-
ticulars of the certificate." '98 Detainment can, however, be expensive for
the port state, for under Article 7, the shipper is entitled to compensation
for any loss suffered while the vessel is delayed.299
MARPOL 73/78 also attempts to ensure compliance by focusing
upon improved technology to stem the flow of oil into the seas. That will
help. So too, will the educational efforts of the IMO to appraise the
world community of the threat of maritime pollution, and the need to
embrace its solutions. Such is the effort to educate oil producing nations
that fresh water ballast could be utilized to grow agricultural products in
the deserts of the Arab world. By creating an economic market for the
contaminated water ballast, the incentive to intentionally flush this valu-
able cargo may be diminished.
The new Law of the Sea Convention offers explicit port and coastal
state enforcement opportunities not provided under prior international
agreements. If the flag state preemption provisions do not effectively
thwart this enforcement mechanism, LOS may well be the catalyst for
more serious compliance and enforcement of nations' antipollution obli-
gations. Let us hope that, with the aid of these new arsenals of weapons,
progress is made in cleaning up the world's oceans.
Success may be thwarted, however, by economic realities and
archaic notions of state sovereignty. Vessel operators have an economic
incentive to pollute rather than internalize the costs of cleanup. Under
the traditional legal regime, they have been subject to the primary sover-
eignty of the state whose flag they fly. The likelihood of detection is not
great; the likelihood of successful prosecution is slimmer still; and the
likelihood of the imposition of a severe penalty upon prosecution is
remote.
Flag states have little economic incentive to police the vessels flying
298 MARPOL 73, supra note 182.
299 Id. at 703.
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their flag. They do have one incentive to appear to perform their interna-
tional obligations in a responsible manner-the threat that a continua-
tion of the status quo will eventually lead the world community to
become so dissatisfied (if not outraged) with continued pollution and the
legal fictions which make such marine contamination possible, that they
begin to call for a new international legal order, one which further
strengthens port and coastal state authority and erodes the flag of con-
venience legal myth (e.g. by establishing a realistic requirement of a
"genuine link" between vessel owner and state of registry). The port and
coastal states, after all, have strong economic incentives to prohibit pollu-
tion within their territorial waters-they have their fishing and tourism
industries to protect.
If MARPOL 73/78 and LOS fail to stem the flow of pollutive dis-
charges into the oceans, some new thinking will have to take place, and
new solutions proposed. One such solution might be the establishment of
an international body (or perhaps on expansion of the jurisdiction of the
IMO) with authority both to issue licenses to ocean vessels (which have
demonstrated compliance with their international obligations) and to ad-
judicate disputes with respect thereto. A pollution complaint would be
brought before the tribunal, which would hear the evidence and argu-
ments on both sides and, upon a finding of guilt, would have the jurisdic-
tion to fire the vessel owner or its crew, and/or to suspend or revoke its
license.
A vessel without a license would not be permitted to enter the port
of any member nation to this regime. Presumably, over a period of time,
the tribunal would develop expertise over maritime pollution problems,
and thereby streamline the evidentiary process. The procedural, jurisdic-
tional, and evidentiary problems which currently exist in the flag state
enforcement regime would likely be reduced significantly. The threat
that aggressive port and coastal state 'self help' enforcement might im-
pede the free flow of foreign commerce would also be diminished. And
while such a proposal would fall short of a world government, it would
require some dilution of the notion of exclusive state sovereignty over
vessels.
"The world regards international law today as in need of rehabilita-
tion. . . a prime cause of its weakness is the absence of an effective sanc-
tion by which its rules can be enforced." 3" James Brierly spoke those
words in 1924; but they are no less appropriate nearly six decades later.
In light of the failure of the existing system of world public order to
300 Brierly, The Shortcomings of International Law in THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 68 (H. Lauterpacht & E. Waldock ed. 1958).
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eliminate vessel-source marine pollution, the effectiveness of interna-
tional law has been denigrated because of its basic inability to compel
compliance.
The conclusion of some international legal scholars is that interna-
tional law is extinct.3"' Others argue that although international law still
exists, its functions are superfluous and even dangerous in a world where
the rule of law has been replaced by the rule of Hobbes.30 2
Traditionally, the solution to the enforcement problem was thought
to be a command system of international law, a world order maintained
by some supranational policeman that could support its commands with
military force. Amid a post-colonial surge of nationalism, however, few
states have been willing to subsume their autonomy to a command
system.30 3
A multi-focal society of autonomous members, such as the present
world order, requires a legal system that structures conflicts through an
informal institutional framework and permits settlement with minimum
disruption. 3° The objective is not the abolition of conflict, but the crea-
tion of an establishment that can handle it before it surpasses control.
Although such a system, based on shared ideological and religious
beliefs, may have existed among the absolute monarchs of Renaissance
Europe, it is difficult to imagine in today's world. Evidence of its devel-
opment among the world's competing ideologies and economic interests
already exists, however.30 5 Covenants regulating international trade and
use of communication channels are complied with routinely.
The system must transcend the merely convenient, however, before
it will significantly influence the problem of marine pollution. The com-
mon, long-term interest of humanity must first develop an ingenuity and
influence surpassing that of national sovereignty before vessel-source pol-
lution can be effectively controlled. The vehicle for that ingenuity may
be the IMO.
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